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SOFTWARE AS TEXT 
John Shaeffer† 
A computer program can be many things. As source code, it is 
unequivocally text and it is unpatentable written material. As text, it 
has syntactical structure, which allows a computer to respond to it, 
and meaning that it communicates to the programming community. A 
computer program is also an audio-visual work; we see it and hear it 
as we interact with it. In this way, protecting a computer program is 
like protecting music, which is often based on both the written score 
and the sounds we hear. But unlike modern music, which does not 
always depend on a written score, a computer program must always 
have source code before it can be heard. 
Much has already been written about whether computer 
programs should be copyrightable, but little has been written about 
access. If a computer program is written in a compiled, rather than 
an interpretive language, the source code will be converted into 
assembly or directly into machine code, neither of which has much 
meaning to anyone but a computer. Access to the audio-visual 
expression of a computer program is different than access to its 
source code, with the former much more likely circumscribed to the 
programs unprotected ideas and functions. The audio-visual structure 
of a computer program is something very different than from the 
architecture and structure of its source code. For this reason, the 
infringement analysis in Lotus Development Corporation v. 
Borland1—which was concerned with the identity in the visual 
structure of menus with no allegation of access to the source code 
used to depict the menus—has little in common with Oracle v. 
Google2—concerned with copying of standard tools used to write 
source code in the JAVA programming language. 
This article suggests that with a closer consideration of the 
practice of computer programming, intellectual property law 
																																								 																				
        †    John Shaeffer is currently a partner at Fox Rothschild LLP in Los Angeles, CA and is 
an adjunct professor at Santa Clara School of Law. The views expressed in this article are those 
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 1. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 2. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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governing the scope and extent of its protection can brought more in 
line with actual practice. With such an understanding, the law as 
applied to computer software can better serve its constitutional 
purpose of promoting the public good. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Source code is not functional. It is instructional. Source code 
describes one of several ways to obtain structured binary data that 
when sequenced to a processor in a particular order causes a computer 
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to perform particular functions. Programming a computer is creative 
in that the methods and styles used to execute the programmed 
functions say a lot about its creator.  
In the same manner that a composer learns from studying the 
musical scores of her predecessors, a novelist learns from reading 
novels, and a filmmaker learns from watching film, programmers 
learn their craft from studying source code and other software 
architecture documents. This is why “[a]ll coding inevitably involves 
double coding. ‘Good’ code simultaneously specifies a mechanical 
process and talks about this mechanical process to a human reader.”3 
This is a central premise underlying the Free and Open Source 
Software Movement (FOSS), a premise currently shared with the 
constitutional underpinning of this country’s intellectual property 
laws that the public good is served by free and open access to the 
ideas and the expression of those ideas. “Free” here requires a precise 
definition: free as in “free speech” or “free trade,” not “free beer.”4 
This article posits a disconnect between how programmers, and 
those who teach programming, view their craft, on the one hand, and 
the laws governing computer software and the academia supporting 
the governing legal structure, on the other. Much has already been 
written about the problems applying existing copyright and patent 
laws to computer programs as well as to the deficiencies in legal 
decisions making such efforts.5 An area less explored, however, is 
whether the law fits with the practice it governs. Little consideration 
has been given to whether the law comports with what programmers 
are actually doing and the product they and their employers make and 
own.  
The law curiously takes a myopic view of computer programs as 
being a utilitarian tool that allow computers to perform functions like 
word processing or reserving a seat on an airline. Programming is far 
more diverse than the law gives it credit for. Identifying the field of 
computer programming with the compiled copy of Microsoft Word is 
somewhat akin to characterizing all literature by referring to the 
design specifications for Boeing’s latest jet—albeit that such design 
																																								 																				
 3. Michael Mateas & Nick Montfort, A Box, Darkly: Obfuscation, Weird Languages, 
and Code Aesthetics, in DIGITAL ARTS AND CULTURE: DIGITAL EXPERIENCE: DESIGN, 
AESTHETICS, PRACTICE (DAC 2005). 
 4. GEOFF COX & ALEX MCLEAN, SPEAKING CODE: CODING AS AESTHETIC AND 
POLITICAL EXPRESSION 77 (MIT Press 2012). 
 5. For example, some of the Federal Circuit continue to push to exclude computer 
programs from the breadth of section 101 of the Patent Act. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer, J., concurring) (“Declaring that 
software implemented on a generic computer falls outside of section 101 would provide much 
needed clarity and consistency in our approach to patent eligibility.”). 
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specification would be more like the source code for Microsoft Word 
than the actual compiled program.  
By way of example, the musical duo Autechre years ago 
dispensed with conventional instruments in favor the visual coding 
language MAX/MPS.6 Their compositions today are distinct 
programs—referred to as patches—that result in computers 
performing functions that, with the help of digital to audio converters, 
generate complex sounds and rhythms. The spontaneity and creativity 
of an artist interacting with a guitar and keyboard is now left to a 
computer interacting with code in a spontaneous and not necessarily 
planned or expected way. Far from being an academic exercise, 
Autechre tours the world playing at large electronic dance music 
festivals and signed to a well-recognized music label.7  
In this context, an Autechre patch functions like a musical 
symphonic score that instructs the members of the orchestra how and 
when to play a note. That the audience for both most likely cannot 
read either the score or the program does not detract from their 
expressive natures. No one would consider the score to Beethoven’s 
Ninth Symphony to be utilitarian because it serves only to instruct 
musicians what to do in a particular time and order as directed by a 
conductor. Does this conclusion change when the sonic generator—
here a computer program—replaces the musicians? This example is 
not isolated. Similar comparisons can be drawn between computer 
games and motion pictures, both of which typically start with a 
scripted story and through the functional manipulation of light sound 
and characters result in a visual narrative that few would consider 
utilitarian. This line becomes almost completely blurred when digital 
animation created on a computer can be ported over to either a digital 
film or an interactive game. 
Law, and in particular our common law system, is evolutionary. 
The law builds on itself. In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress took 
sides and adopted the recommendation of an expert panel to codify 
the copyright law’s protection of computer software, a somewhat 
controversial decision at the time. Curiously, while this expert panel 
included some of the most noted authorities on copyright law, the 
panel did not include any experts in computer software.8 Courts have 
																																								 																				
 6. For a more in-depth discussion, see Joe Muggs, Autechre: elseq et al, RESIDENT 
ADVISOR (June 8, 2016), http://bit.do/Autechre. Autechre is merely one popular example of 
musicians using code as an instrument of sound. A listing of similar artists can be found at 
http://bit.do/alograve. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs in Machine Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 699 (1984) [hereinafter 
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struggled to apply the terms of this recommendation. Many challenge 
the decision that copyright law should govern computer programs, 
arguing instead that computer programs are by their nature functional. 
Therefore, they should be governed by patent law, if protected at all. 
During this same period, however, the Patent Bar has struggled with 
the extent to which patent law does and can reach computer 
programs.  
This article offers a do-over.9 Knowing what we know now, 
should computer programs be governed by copyright law? The 
answer will be yes. First, we will discuss software programming, 
what it is and how it is done, from the perspective of those who 
program and teach programming. True, the result of programming is 
software that causes a computer to be able to perform particular 
functions. But the process of programming is much more than simple 
machine code that when received by a processor in a particular order 
result in an output of binary data in a particular order. Again a simple 
example, software vulnerabilities are among the biggest threat to this 
nation’s interconnected computer systems. The most common cause 
of a software vulnerability is an error in the coding of a commercially 
functioning program that can be exploited to give, among other 
things, an unintended person access to a system. Such vulnerabilities 
are typically fixed (closed) with a software patch consisting of 
different source code that when compiled will instruct the computer 
to perform the same function, but without the unintended exploitation, 
i.e. the machine code that can cause a computer to perform a 
particular function can be programmed innumerable ways. Achieving 
intended functionality at the machine level—whether it is to allow my 
word process to visually reflect my keystroke or to cause a particular 
note to be played at a particular time—can be achieved through a 
variety of instructions.  
Software programming involves choices: choices of architecture, 
structure, paradigms and language. These choices are as frequently 
aesthetic—having no functional value—as utilitarian. With a more 
precise understanding of programming, the law can better achieve the 
constitutional goal of providing certain protections to certain 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
Samuelson, CONTU Revisited] (“There were no computer scientists, no software or hardware 
industry representatives, nor any users of complex software systems on the Commission. 
Because Congress had decided that the composition of the Commission should reflect the 
interests of groups concerned about the computerization of hard-copy works and about 
photocopying, this is not surprising.”). 
 9. Id. at 754 (“Lawyers, judges, and legislators often find it difficult to step back and 
take a long, hard look at the law to determine whether it ‘works’ as it was intended to work. 
Many persons closely involved with the software industry believe that the existing means of 
legal protection for computer programs in machine-readable form do not work satisfactorily.”). 
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intellectual property in a manner that furthers the public good. 
Simply, like anything, there is no “one size fits all.” Case law 
concerning copyright liability arising from mimicking functionality 
based on observations of a compiled program in use, has little if any 
application to copying functionality from a review of source code or 
software design documents. 
Next, copyright law at a basic level will be considered. Existing 
jurisprudence and academic research in the area of copyright 
protection for computer software tends to focus on copyrightability 
and substantial similarity, while ignoring other elements necessary for 
liability. Decision after decision struggle with whether what was 
purportedly copied was copyrightable expression as opposed to an 
unprotected idea, function, structure, or process. Unlike other 
categories protected by copyright, a large portion of publicly 
available software programs intentionally block access to all but the 
most occult elements of what is literary about a program. In this way 
commercial software programs are unique. As part of the copyright 
bargain, the computer program discloses its unprotected ideas, 
functions and process, but intentionally hides its written expression—
how it teaches the ideas, processes and functions disclosed. While 
copying the entirety of a compiled program necessarily takes both 
what the program teaches and how it teaches it—and is universally 
considered copyright infringement—it is another thing to discern how 
a program teaches a particular idea, function or process simply by 
reviewing its assembled code or observing its operation.  
Little can be learned about how its creator(s) expressed the 
instruction that achieved the requisite function by reviewing either the 
assembled code or the binary machine code. This means that literally 
copying anything short of the complete executable program will be of 
little value and thus unlikely. Few, if any cases, accuse a defendant of 
copying portions of either the assembled code or the more basic 
machine code in order to achieve functionality. Instead, in such cases 
it is argued that observing functionality is a surrogate for access to the 
expression of that functionality—how the functionality is taught in 
the source code. By analogy, this is like someone telling me the 
general plot of Star Wars from which I write my own Parsifal-like 
space movie. Arguably, enough could be conveyed in the recitation to 
trigger liability, but there is a gap in access between the idea (or 
function) expressed and how the idea (or function) was actually 
expressed 
Few would disagree that I would commit copyright infringement 
if I copied my neighbor’s DVD of Call of Duty in order to play the 
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game on my computer, or that this type of copying is any different 
than coping an .mp3 of the latest Beyoncé album or using a torrent to 
download the latest Star Trek movie. Difficulty and disputes arise 
when copying is not exact and the allegation is whether the new work 
was derived from the protected work in a manner that violates 
copyright law, i.e., the new work is a protected derivative work. 
Consistent with the most basic principles of copyright law, if what is 
taken is so far removed from protectable expression to be only the 
ideas, facts, functions or processes of the underlying work, rather than 
how these elements were express, then there is no infringement. 
Drawing this line, however, is what is difficult.  
 The copyright law gives the holder of a copyright the right to 
prevent others from copying their work. When copying is given, 
infringement has occurred, but may be defensible as a fair use. For 
example, if what was copied was simply code allowing an application 
to work with an operating system—interoperability—or simply code 
that helps programmers to write in a given language—as was the case 
in Oracle v. Google—the copying may actually further the public 
good rather than result merely in a new work that substitutes for the 
protected work. Allowing a defendant to prove her copying fair—for 
example to achieve interoperability—will be shown to be an easier 
approach to address thorny issues of permissible copying than to 
argue in such instances particular code is no copyrightable because, 
for example, its expression has merged with what should be a 
publicly available function. 
The Copyright Act does not include a de minimis exception. 
While a use may be fair, an initial prima facie case of infringement 
cannot be defeated by arguing how little was copied. The substantial 
similarity test—which has been used by some to support a de minimis 
exception—governs only when there is no direct evidence of copying, 
allowing copying to be presumed when two works are so similar that 
independent creation is unlikely. “Substantial similarity” is not a 
separate test. So since Congress has decided to protect computer 
programs under copyright law, when actual copying is acknowledged 
infringement has occurred, but the use may be fair, as in the case of 
copying necessary for needed interoperability. 
The article will also discuss patent law for the sake of 
comparison. Like copyright law, patent law does not protect ideas, 
processes or functions, but instead protects them as used. For this 
reason, patent law does not protect source code, which consists 
merely of written instructions. Patent law can protect the ultimate 
function that the compiled code allows the computer to practice, so 
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long as the code enhances the functionality of the computer in a 
unique way. There is, however, a meaningful distinction between the 
function that the source code enables the computer to perform and the 
instructions, structure and architecture of the source code itself that 
once compiled allows that function to occur. Rather than there being 
any risk of overlap between patent and copyright law with respect to 
software programming, there is a gap between the two because, 
despite the simple language of Section 101 of the Patent Act, not all 
ideas, functions or processes are patentable and copyright law does 
not protect ideas, functions or processes. 
Finally, the article proposes that copyright law should govern 
most of what falls within the practice of software programming. 
Arguable, the public at large has suffered due to the ambiguity 
surrounding copyright law’s role. Unsure of the legal protection 
surrounding source code in particular, technology companies 
dependent upon their developed programs to survive and prosper lock 
their source code from public view, thus denying the public access to 
the ideas expressed in that code. Placing computer programs in the 
unique position of being able profit from their ideas and function 
without teaching how they achieve the functionality—the idea or 
function is disclosed while only disclosing a minimal amount of the 
expression of that function. In direct response, FOSS use copyright 
law for the express purpose of avoiding this practice, requiring under 
certain licenses that the use of protected code be conditioned on the 
user similarly making publicly available their source code.  
Aware that the existing jurisprudence has made application of 
copyright law to computer program difficult, the article suggests 
looking to the rest of copyright law jurisprudence to assess the 
breadth of relevant protection. For example, the earliest days of this 
country’s copyright law dispels any notion that copyright law does 
not protect works that have utility. As initially enacted, the Copyright 
Act protected the expressive elements of charts and maps irrespective 
of the fact these were unquestionably works of utility. Similarly, 
questions about whether copyright law should reach the structure and 
architecture of a software program’s design is readily answered by 
how works of literature and film are assessed for infringement, which 
typically turns on structural considerations rather than proof of literal 
copying.  
Concerns about the overlap between expression and function that 
purportedly plagues the protection of software programs can be 
addressed by looking to the scope of protection afforded works of 
science and non-fiction. Copyright law does not protect the facts, 
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formulas, processes or compounds discussed in non-fiction and 
academic literature, but only how the same is expressed. Stated 
simply, copyright law does not protect what is taught, but instead, 
protects how it is taught. Anyone involved with pedagogy knows 
there exist enumerable texts teaching the same subject matter, but 
teachers, often subjectively, prefer one text over another. Those 
familiar with historiography know that the telling of history is not 
simply collecting facts in chronological order. Facts relevant to any 
historical event are enumerable, but the same history can be told in 
multiple ways with multiple conclusions depending on the politics of 
the speaker. The creativity that drives success in these other areas 
drives success in programming. There is simply not one way to 
instruct a computer on how to perform any given function, and 
programmers learn from each other by studying approaches for 
structuring and designing source code that can cause a computer to 
perform particular functionality.  
As most programmers will readily acknowledge, the success of a 
computer program is not driven by a code’s elegance or efficiency, 
but ultimately by its consumer’s preference. The most efficient and 
functional program is of little or no value if its intended consumers do 
not use it, a preference driven more by the aesthetics of taste than 
anything else. So while computer programs are unquestionably about 
function and utility, what differentiates programs is about much more. 
Most people today have a preference for Apple, Microsoft, android or 
LINUX, and many are passionate about their positions. Yet, when 
pressed, these preferences are more about taste than objective 
functional differences, little different than a preference for Taylor 
Swift over Mozart, or fish over chicken.  
Shoring up copyright’s governance of computer programs, 
however, is not without problems. In particular, as an artifact of the 
laws development, creators can wait for years or decades before 
publicly disclosing their rights in a work and asserting such rights. 
The collaborative nature of many popular software programs—
incorporating existing publicly available code that preforms specific 
rudimentary tasks rather than recreating the wheel—makes this ability 
to lie and wait particularly problematic. This ability to disrupt the 
availability of programs is a leading reason why many advocate 
against copyright law governing computer programs. This anomaly, 
however, can be addressed by amending the Copyright Act to include 
a prompt “register or lose it” requirement as well as an explanatory 
marking requirement.  
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I.  WHAT IS COMPUTER PROGRAMMING?  
A. Language As Instruction 
All language by its nature is instructional. In this way, all 
language is functional. When we say, “Can I have a cup of coffee?” 
we expect a functional response—we will receive a cup of coffee. 
Even purely aesthetic speech is functional. Shakespeare had ideas of 
human nature that he wanted to convey to an audience. He utilized the 
rules of the English language, its syntax and grammar, for a 
semantical end. This end is no different than when we are attending a 
cocktail party and recounting the day’s events. We intend to convey 
meaning—we want to be understood. How our speech is 
understood—its function—however, many not always be apparent. 
There is no such thing as neutral speech.10 Whether intended or not all 
speech invokes action by the recipient, even if the listener simply 
concludes “that was a dull story” (which was probably not the 
function the speaker intended to invoke). The process of 
programming makes the functional nature of language concrete—
code both says what it is going to do and does it.11 
Language is like money in that it is nothing, but it affects 
everything.12 Language is unique in that it is the only concept that 
cannot be described without using itself. Language, however, is 
inherently imprecise. It can never accurately convey meaning. 
Language is a mediating tool between our thought and the recipient of 
the words conveyed.13 While each language has its rules aimed at 
achieving semantical precision, there is no objectively optimal way to 
convey anything. This is one reason why speaking in the presence of 
someone is less likely to be misinterpreted—convening meaning not 
intended—than more remote forms of communication such as over 
the phone or by email.14 Visual and auditory clues accompanying 
language add to its precision in ways that an emoji cannot convey. 
																																								 																				
 10. LUCE IRIGARAY, TO SPEAK IS NEVER NEUTRAL (Gail Schwab trans., Routledge 
2002) (1985) (demonstrating that the language use in peer review scientific article is political 
and not neutral). 
 11. COX & MCLEAN, supra note 4, at xii. 
 12. Id. at x. 
 13. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton Thirtieth-
Anniversary ed. 2009) (1979); Chris van Rompaey, Language and Meaning in the Ethics. Or, 
Why Bother with Spinoza’s Latin?, 24 PARRHESIA 336–66 (2015) (demonstrating how meaning 
is lost in translating Spinoza from Latin to English). 
 14. Curiously programmed listening devices like Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa are 
experimenting with visual mechanisms that will allow the computer to look at the speaker to 
better understand the request made. Will Knight, Chatbots with Social Skills Will Convince You 
to Buy Something, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 26, 2016), http://bit.do/KnightChatbots. 
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The existence of our legal profession is a testament to the 
imprecise functional nature of language. Legislatures pass laws for 
the functional purpose of defining rules for a particular situation. By 
their nature, however, laws written generally will necessarily effect 
specific situations arbitrarily.15 Every business days reviewing courts 
throughout the United States, including the United States Supreme 
Court when in session, consider written and oral position of opposing 
sides each of whom believe their use of language will achieve for 
them a function, a decision in their favor. The language presented has 
a function, to persuade towards a position. Neither the parties’ briefs 
nor the decision by any court are objectively optimal, but rather are 
always political. They advocate for an end, but what is conveyed can 
never be objectively optimal, a point demonstrated when someone 
invariably says, “they got it wrong.” 
Language can also be an intermediary to function. We know that 
a written play or a motion picture script are instructions for a 
performance; i.e., we can read a play or a script and envision the 
function that that language enables. The language is necessary to 
achieve the function and in this way a script is utilitarian. In this way, 
a script is like the blue print for a building—each provides instruction 
on how to achieve a desired product—either a motion picture or a 
home.  
The aesthetic pleasure we derive from a film or a novel is not 
limited to the story told. In fact, it is much more about how the story 
is told, its mood, pacing, structure. Many would scoff comparing 
Romeo and Juliet or West Side Story to the Twilight series, but are 
they not telling the same story, built on the same idea, just expressed 
in different ways? Every year thousands travel to the Bayreuth 
Festival and watch “new production” of one or more of the thirteen 
operas written by Richard Wagner and critics will debate endlessly 
the merits, or lack thereof, of the latest staging. Similarly, historians 
do not consider Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire to be one of the greatest works of non-fiction because of its 
factual accuracy or conciseness.  
Our ability to understand language says nothing about whether a 
writing that enables a function is simply utilitarian. The fact that the 
language of physics and math rely on numbers and symbols for 
expression do not render the symbols and numbers merely utilitarian 
objects to achieve a function. A better example is a symphonic score. 
Many of us could identify Mozart’s Requiem by hearing an excerpt, 
but few of us could identify the work if given a page from its score. 
																																								 																				
 15. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994) (1961). 
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Most would agree that the value of the Mozart’s score is that it allows 
a conductor and trained musicians to play the piece, it functions as an 
intermediary between Mozart’s idea and the musicians, but no one 
would say that our inability to similarly understand the score renders 
the score a simply utility. Does this analysis change when today a 
computer can convert this score into a MIDI file that allows a 
computer to cause a listener to hear Mozart’s Requiem.16 In both 
instances, the instructions are hidden from the audience, but their 
function is apparent, we hear music. 
Language in all its forms, whether English, Chinese or musical 
notations, or a mathematical proof consists of rules governing 
symbols for the purpose conveying meaning.17 “The essential 
property of language is that it provides the means for expressing 
indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an 
indefinite range of new situations.”18 Syntax “refer[s] to the rules of a 
language for the grouping of words into a larger units, i.e. 
sentences.”19 From the study of syntax of a language one can 
construct a “grammar” or the rules and principals applied to 
efficiently and effectively use the language to communicate.20 
“[G]rammar is autonomous and independent of meaning.”21 The 
study of “generative grammar” “attempts to characterize in the most 
neutral of terms the knowledge of the language that provides the basis 
for actual use of language by a speaker-hearer.”22 Semantics refers to 
the meaning of the words conveyed.23  
																																								 																				
 16. See PhotoScore MIDI, SIBELIUS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://bit.do/SibeliusPhotoScore. 
 17. Noam Chomsky, On Certain Formal Properties of Grammars, 2 INFO. & CONTROL 
137, 137 (1959) [hereinafter Chomsky, Formal Properties of Grammars] (“A language is a 
collection of sentences of finite length all constructed from a finite alphabet of symbols.”); 
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX v (MIT Press 1965) [hereinafter 
CHOMSKY, THEORY OF SYNTAX] (“The idea that a language is based on a system of rules 
determining the interpretation of its infinitely many sentences is by no means novel.”). 
 18. CHOMSKY, THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 17, at 6.  
 19. Raymond Hickey, Syntax, 1 (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://bit.do/HickeySyntax; NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES 11 (Mouton de Gruyter 
2d ed. 2002) (1957) [hereinafter, CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES] (“Syntax is the study of 
the principles and processes by which sentences are constructed in particular languages. 
Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the construction of a grammar that 
can be viewed as a device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under 
analysis.”). 
 20. PAWEŁ LULA ET AL., PROGRAMMING METHODS AND TOOLS (Jan Madej ed., Cracow 
Univ. of Econ. 2014); Chomsky, Formal Properties of Grammars, supra note 17, at 137 (“A 
grammar can be regarded as a device that enumerates the sentences of a language.”). 
 21. CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES, supra note 19, at 17. 
 22. CHOMSKY, THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 17, at 9. 
 23. NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND 102 (Cambridge Univ. Press 3d ed. 2006) 
(2005) [hereinafter CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND MIND] (“At the crudest level of description, we 
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Linguists are those who study the grammar, syntax and 
semantics of language. Traditionally, they have developed theories of 
grammar from the study of existing languages. The work of linguists 
with natural languages, and in particular the work of Noam Chomsky, 
have profoundly influence the development and understanding of 
programming or artificial languages.24 Rather than identifying the 
grammar of an existing language, programmers use the theories and 
rules identified by linguists as necessary for a language to build 
artificial languages.25 In this context, building a language that can 
both speak to, and be understood by, the community of programmers 
and simultaneously instruct a computer how to act—i.e. a useful 
artificial language.26 In this context, programming language make use 
of Chomsky’s notion of transformational grammars. The idea that 
each sentence in a language has two structures: a deep structure—that 
determines the semantic interpretation of a sentence; and a surface 
structure—the syntactical representation,27 stated very simply, the 
distinction between what is meant and how it is said. Linguists in 
their study presume “an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely 
homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly 
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations . . . and errors . . . in applying his knowledge of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
may say that a language associates sound and meaning in a particular way; to have command of 
a language is to be able, in principle, to understand what is said and to produce a signal with an 
intended semantic interpretation.”). 
 24. Fotis Georgatos, How Applicable Is Python as First Computer Language for 
Teaching Programming in a Pre-University Educational Environment, from a Teacher’s Point of 
View? (June 2002) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam) (“Noam 
Chomsky’s Generative Theory of Grammars has, probably, influenced Computer Science more 
than the field of Natural Languages itself.”). 
 25. Jukka Paakki, Attribute Grammar Paradigms—A High-Level Methodology in 
Language Implementation, 27 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 196, 199 (1995) (“Designing a 
programming language is an intellectual challenge of considerable complexity (for an overview, 
see Wasserman [1980]). One of the most important considerations is the description of the 
language. The description must be illustrative enough for a language user, and precise enough 
for a language implementor.”). 
 26. PAWEŁ LULA ET AL., supra note 20, at 35 (“The construction of these artificial 
languages is currently accompanied by the construction of their grammars, which are strongly 
formalized from the beginning. Thanks to this, the translation process, meaning the automatic 
translation of a program designed to be convenient for humans (that is, the one expressed in an 
algorithmic language which is clear and understandable to the programmer) to the so-called 
internal code (binary strings controlling the operation of a machine, mainly microprocessors) 
can be conducted quickly and efficiently.”). 
 27. CHOMSKY, THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 17, at 16 (“Consequently, the syntactic 
component of a grammar must specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines its 
semantic interpretation and a surface structure- that determines its phonetic interpretation. The 
first of these is interpreted by the semantic component; the second, by the phonological 
component.”). 
2017] SOFTWARE AS TEXT  337 
the language in actual performance.”28 With a computer the speaker 
has the linguist’s assumed listener who will respond literally to each 
instruction as syntactically presented, meaning precision in a 
language and speaker is not merely assumed but required.29 
B. What Is a Computer Program? 
It is significant that the Copyright Act defines “a ‘computer 
program’ [a]s a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”30 The 
Legislature adopted the language of literature rather than words of 
mechanization, such as methods, process, rules or algorithms. As 
such, computer programs are protected under the Copyright Act from 
the perspective of their author as literary works. “Literary works,’, 
according to the Act are “works, other than audiovisual works, 
expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or 
indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, 
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in 
which they are embodied.”31  
Most of us do not experience computer programs from the 
perspective of an author. At least since the advent of icon driving 
visual programs, our experience as end users of software is not a 
literary experience, but an audio visual experience. We do not read a 
program, but physically point and click on icons or identifiers to 
which we ascribe meaning. The Copyright Act separately protects 
audiovisual works, defining them as “works that consist of a series of 
related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use 
of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic 
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the 
works are embodied.”32 Courts have not hesitated to recognize that 
the Copyright Act protects the expressive audio visual components of 
a computer program, such as in a video game, but this protection does 
																																								 																				
 28. Id. at 3. 
 29. LULA ET AL., supra note 20, at 35 (“Correctness of the various language structures is 
dealt with by syntax. It turns out that it is syntax that is most important in computer science, 
because the entire practice of using artificial languages (the so-called algorithmic languages), 
which are the basis of modern methods of programming, is based on it.”). 
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 101. This definition is remarkably similar to definitions commonly found 
in programming tests. LULA ET AL., supra note 20, at 126 (“A computer program consists of a 
sequence of statements executed by the computer.”). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 32. Id. 
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not substitute or replace the separate protection of the computer 
programs as literary works.33 
Similarly, some scholars attempt to put computer programs 
under the rubric of copyright protection for “pictorial, graphic and 
sculptural works” which include “two dimensional . . . works of fine, 
graphic and applied arts, . . . maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models 
and technical drawings, including architectural plans.”34 Following 
then existing jurisprudence, Congress expressly limited copyright 
protection for such works “only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently 
of, the utilitarian aspect of the article.”35 If the pictorial 
representations exhibited by a software program cannot be separated 
from their utilitarian functionality—as was the case in Lotus v. 
Borland36—the depictions, are not copyrightable. This reasoning, 
																																								 																				
 33. Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Micro Star further 
argues that the MAP files are not derivative works because they do not, in fact, incorporate any 
of D/N-3D’s protected expression. In particular, Micro Star makes much of the fact that the N/I 
MAP files reference the source art library, but do not actually contain any art files themselves. 
Therefore, it claims, nothing of D/N-3D’s is reproduced in the MAP files. In making this 
argument, Micro Star misconstrues the protected work. The work that Micro Star infringes is the 
D/N-3D story itself—a beefy commando type named Duke who wanders around post-
Apocalypse Los Angeles, shooting Pig Cops with a gun, lobbing hand grenades, searching for 
medkits and steroids, using a jetpack to leap over obstacles, blowing up gas tanks, avoiding 
radioactive slime. A copyright owner holds the right to create sequels.”); Tetris Holding, LLC v. 
Xio Interactive, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408-11 (D.N.J. 2012) (although undisputed that no 
code was copied, the court found the audio visual displays of the games sufficiently similar to 
infer copying and infringement); compare DaVinci Editrice, SRL v. Ziko Games, LLC, No. H-
13-3415 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (finding audio visual elements copied in games were unprotected 
rules and ideas rather than creative expression). 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 101; Wendy J. Gordon, How Oracle Erred: Functionality, Useful 
Articles, and the Future of Computer Copyright 41 (2016), http://bit.do/GordonOracleErred. A 
shortened version “How Oracle Erred” will be published in the anthology, COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (RUTH OKEJIDI ed., forthcoming 2016) (“While 
neither of these facts about the use of computer programs is sufficient to resolve the Oracle case, 
they remind us computer code may be a ‘useful article’ and that like all useful articles, 
considerations of patent deference can and should play a strong role.”). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 101; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (holding statuette base of 
a lamp copyrightable even though the entire product functions as a lamp); Am. Dental Ass’n v. 
Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1997) (“A lamp may be entirely original, 
but if the novel elements are also functional the lamp cannot be copyrighted. This is not a line 
between intellectual property and the public domain; it is a line among bodies of intellectual-
property law.”). 
 36. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 817 (“Computer programs, unlike VCRs, are copyrightable as 
‘literary works.’ 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Accordingly, one might argue, the ‘buttons’ used to operate 
a computer program are not like the buttons used to operate a VCR, for they are not subject to a 
useful-article exception. The response, of course, is that the arrangement of buttons on a VCR 
would not be copyrightable even without a useful-article exception, because the buttons are an 
uncopyrightable ‘method of operation.’ Similarly, the ‘buttons’ of a computer program are also 
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however, says nothing about whether the protectable expression 
computer program itself, as defined in the Copyright Act, is 
copyrightable. 
The “statement or instructions” to which the Act’s definition of a 
computer program refers is commonly ascribed to the “code” that 
makes up the program, but should not be limited to the code itself. 
Most of us at best have a rudimentary understanding of what “code” 
does and have even less of an understanding of what it is. By way of 
analog, we can identify Chinese characters and know that the 
characters convey meaning, but most of us do not know what they 
mean. We have no understanding of the syntax or grammar of 
Chinese language so it is semantically meaningless to us. Simply 
because we cannot comprehend the Chinese language or it structure, 
however, does not render the language or works created with it 
simply functional and utilitarian and deserving of only minimal 
copyright protections.  
The analogy between the Chinese language and computer 
programming is apt in this context. John R. Searle, the noted 
philosopher, proposed the following thought experiment. A person 
who does not understand Chinese is given questions written in 
Chinese characters. “He transfers the Chinese Characters into other 
Chinese characters solely through the completely formal, step-by-step 
guidance of an English rule book. Thanks to the precise 
transformation rules, the results are flawless Chinese replies to 
Chinese questions.”37 While Professor Searle experiment was directed 
to whether a computer has intelligence—it responds to syntax and 
grammar without grasping the underlying semantics38—the 
experiment is relevant to our understanding to the semantics of code. 
Unable to grasp the meaning of either the written source code or the 
operational machine code, our understanding of a computer program 
is limited to the functions it causes the black box we know as a 
computer to perform.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
an uncopyrightable ‘method of operation.’”). 
 37. FLORIAN CRAMER, WORDS MADE FLESH: CODE, CULTURE, IMAGINATION 107 
(2005). 
 38. COX, supra note 4, at 31 (“Searle’s position is based on the linguistic distinction 
between syntax and semantics as applied to the digital computer or Turing machine as a 
‘symbol-manipulating device,’ where the units have no meaning in themselves (a position that 
follows from semiotics).”); CRAMER, supra note 37, at 67-68 (“In 1948, Claude Shannon, a 
telecommunication engineer at the AT&T Bell Labs, coined a concept of information that did 
away with all semantics. It made information a technically quantifiable, measurable entity for 
determining (a) the transmission capacity of a channel and (b) the technical redundancy of 
data.”). 
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Since most of us do not believe in magic, unfamiliar syntax and 
grammar without a grasp of semantics is easily categorized as purely 
utilitarian—I can perform the desired function by simply hitting the 
key on a keyboard in order to see words appear on the screen. Our 
lack of semantical understanding of the instructions does not alone 
render the instructions purely utilitarian. If the travel guide I am using 
to navigate my way through Berlin happens to be all in German, but I 
can match street names with the names in my guide even though I do 
not speak German, does not render the guide solely utilitarian. 
Similarly, the fact the music I am now listening to is simply binary 
code that my computer can read and translate into the sound I am now 
hearing does not mean that the song I am now listening to is simply 
utilitarian. Stated starkly, no one would accept as a defense to 
copyright infringement by a torrent that proves access to copyrighted 
material the argument that all it does is provide access to binary code. 
Much the jurisprudence concerning computer programs focuses 
on the end product, the function the program performs for the end 
user rather than from the author’s literary process resulting in that 
functionality. In the same way that there is no objectively superior 
way to teach someone math, English, physics, or software 
engineering there is no objectively superior way to instruct a 
computer to perform a particular task, whether that task is a new 
online reservation system for an airline, a video game to compete 
with Call of Duty, or code to oscillate light and sound based on 
movement in a room for an installation at the Pompidou in Paris. As 
will be discussed below, copyright is not concerned at all with what 
any of these teach. Instead, copyright will protect original way each is 
taught. 
C. How We Interact with Computer Programs 
1. How Consumers Interact with Computer Programs 
Computer programs are everywhere. “Wherever there is a 
microprocessor, there is software.”39 Microprocessors are not 
confined to what we would perceive as computer or its progeny—cell 
phones and tablets—but are now present in our cars, traffic lights and 
coffee makers. Some would say that the highly trained engineers and 
machinists who historically designed, developed, and manufactured 
																																								 																				
 39. ERIK PIÑEIRO, THE AESTHETICS OF CODE: ON EXCELLENCE IN INSTRUMENTAL 
ACTION 28 (2003). The recent denial of service attack that crippled a meaningful portion of the 
internet is a testament to this now that it has been discovered that the botnet consisted mostly of 
web-enhanced devices like cameras and refrigerators. Such devices are an easy target because 
users rarely change the factory default passwords for these devices. 
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machines for particular purposes have now been replaced by software 
engineers who design and develop code that allow a generic 
machine—or more specifically a generic microprocessor—to perform 
specific tasks or improve upon the products of the past by making 
them “smart.” This analogy of code with “gears, wires, and screws” 
allows us to see code as simply functional industrial design, 
something not considered within the realm of copyright protection.40 
A programs, however, is unlike any other form of industrial design 
because “it is a machine built of text.”41  
Importantly, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected this 
notion of code as a “component” like a gear or screw. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. held that 
“code” is not a “component” within the meaning of section 271(f) of 
the Patent Act, which provides that infringement does occur even if a 
“product is made or sold in another country … when one ‘supplies … 
from the United States,’ for ‘combination’ abroad, a patented 
invention’s ‘components.’”42 Instead, the Supreme Court considers 
“software code [to be] an idea without physical embodiment, and as 
such, it does not match § 271(f)’s categorization: ‘components’ 
amenable to ‘combination.’”43 Software, according to the Court, is a 
“‘set of instructions . . . that directs a computer to perform specified 
functions or operations.’”44 The Court considers code to be more akin 
to “[a] blueprint [that] may contain precise instructions for the 
construction and combination of the components of a patented device, 
but it is not itself a combinable component of that device.”45  
While we rely on media to house this text, the text itself is 
amorphous. With most industrial design, the finished product 
discloses not only how it works, but the methods employed to achieve 
that functionality. Commercial software for the most part is different. 
While we are told how to make the software work, the 
commercialization of the product does not similarly require full 
																																								 																				
 40. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COL. L. REV. 2308, 2321 (1994) [hereinafter Samuelson et al., Manifesto 
Concerning Legal Protection]. 
 41. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 119 (2000); Dan L. Burk, 
Method and Madness in Copyright, 3 UTAH L. REV. 587, 614 (2007) (“For our purposes here 
this is significant because construction of a device by writing text is equivalent to constructing 
the device by soldering metal or molding polymers: both will execute processes to produce a 
determined, monovalent outcome.”). 
 42. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). 
 43. Id. at 449. 
 44. Id. at 447 (quoting Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 
1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 45. Id. at 450.  
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disclosure the expressive text employed to achieve that functionality. 
While our hard drives include program folders housing files needed 
for the software to operate, opening those files and viewing snippets 
of the assembled language tells us little about the textual instructions 
used to achieve this functionality.. With the appropriate software we 
can also view and access the object code—the binary string of on and 
off positions that causes a processor to perform a particular task—but 
the ability decompile from this string the instruction that when 
compiled achieved this functionality is fraught with difficulties.46  
Unlike almost any other form of creative or industrial endeavor, 
one cannot copy snippets of object code from a complied program or 
grab files from the assembled code and insert them into a new 
program and expect to achieve any sort of functionality. Copying a 
compiled program, therefore, is an all-or-nothing affair. Many of us 
can attest to this when we have been unable to launch a program 
consisting of millions of lines of code simply because we mistakenly 
deleted a single .dll file from a program. Copying the entire 
executable, which allows the copier to utilize the program is 
universally considered copyright infringement and is clearly 
something Congress intended copyright law to prevent.47 Actually 
copying something less than the entire compiled code, while still 
copying within the meaning of the Copyright Act, has little practical 
utility and rarely the subject of any copyright case. For this reason, 
programming is compared to “building [with] toothpicks carefully 
glued together . . . if just one toothpick is out of place the whole thing 
comes crumbling down.”48 
																																								 																				
 46. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (Atari, unable to accurately determine the lock for game cartridges improperly obtained a 
copy of the program’s source code to correct the errors it made attempting to decompile the 
object code). 
 47. Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Documents, Reverse 
Engineering, and Professor Miller, 193 U. OF DAYTON L. REV. 975, 975 (1994) (“The debate is 
not over copying of code for resale or for the purpose of creating a usable second program to 
accomplish the function intended by its author. Copying of this type constitutes copyright 
infringement, and copyright laws work well as a legal prohibition of that kind of piracy.”); 
Gordon, supra note 34, at 41-42 (“Copying an entire copyrighted computer program will of 
necessity make use of both expressive and nonexpressive aspects, and using the copy—even 
using it to run a machine—could therefore infringe.”); Jonathan Ambrose, Oracle America Inc. 
v. Google, Inc.: The Only Nonliteral Aspect of JAVA API’s Protected Under copyright law are 
the Ones Nobody Wants to Copy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 22 (2012) (“Two reasons exist for 
copyright protection as a method for protecting computer programs from infringement. First, the 
ease and utility with which computer code can be copied necessitate that direct, mechanical 
copying be protected by copyright law. Compared to mechanical inventions, computer programs 
are quick, easy, and inexpensive to copy.”). 
 48. PIÑEIRO, supra note 39, at 216. 
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Our perception of a computer program is derived from how we 
interact with programs. “We are used to consider[ing] software as a 
tool, and we usually come in contact with it under the form of an 
application. For instance, we see the user-interface and through it we 
interact with an invisible system.”49 Our experience is limited to 
utility and functionality, with the instructions achieving that 
functionality hidden from view.  
We can observe a program’s function and ask another 
programmer to write for us a program that performs the same 
observed function. In this context, however, what is copied is the 
unprotected function, process or idea because we never saw the text 
that expressed this function process or idea.50 Even if somehow the 
programmer’s source code to mimic the observed functionality turns 
out to be identical with the hidden source code, there would be no 
infringement of the source code because the programmer could not 
have copied the source code.51 This is no different from me asking an 
artist to recreate an unphotographed tapestry of Buddha sitting under 
a lotus tree found in a remote Tibetan temple based only on my 
recollection of what I saw. At best, the artist could copy the idea 
conveyed, but without access to the creative work itself, the artist 
could not copy any protected expression of the idea. Simply, you 
cannot copy the text, or create a new work derived from the text or its 
structure, without meaningful access to the text itself. 
Exposed to only the utility and functionality of a program, and 
without an understanding of process of programming, we expect that 
																																								 																				
 49. Id. at 42. 
 50. This is an explanation for the holding in Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810, in which the defendant 
unquestionably copied the visual depiction of the command hierarchy of the spreadsheet 
program Lotus 1-2-3 for its competing software program Quatro Pro. See Pamela Samuelson, 
Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright 
Infringement 20 (2015), http://bit.do/SamuelsonFunctionality [hereinafter Samuelson, 
Functionality and Expression] (“Lotus v. Borland is the best known of the cases addressing 
whether a command structure of a computer program user interface (UI) is protectable by 
copyright law.”). The visual depictions of the command hierarchy at issue in Lotus are 
fundamentally different than the hierarchy and structure of the source code that achieves this 
functionality. There is no dispute that in Lotus the defendant did not have access to the 
underlying source code for Lotus 1-2-3 and had not attempted to gain access through a review 
of the program object code or its assembled code. Instead, what was copied was how the 
program visually depicted its hierarch, which is something different than the instructions the 
program follows to achieve this functionality, which is the definition of a computer program 
under the Copyright Act. 
 51. Mazer, supra note 35, at 217-18 (“The distinction is illustrated in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. 
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151, [(SDNY1924) (L. Hand, J.)] when the court speaks of two men, 
each a perfectionist, independently making maps of the same territory. Though the maps are 
identical, each may obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet 
neither will infringe the other’s copyright.”). 
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“software is governed by some sort of objective methodology 
according to which programmers simply carry out calculations and 
writing the correct commands.”52 “A common lay belief is that 
programming takes place in highly structured environments, relying 
solely on formal languages and standard techniques, with little or no 
room for creativity.”53 From this perspective, ““[p]rogramming does 
not allow personal expression, it is simply a matter of solving 
mechanic puzzles.”54 “[P]rogramming is regarded as an exclusively 
instrumental activity, something done just in order to achieve a result: 
the actual doing is meaningless.”55 It is “something better optimized, 
minimized, made efficient…. If machines could do it, so much the 
better: programming in itself is not interesting, only the results are.”56 
This “utilitarian perspective reduces the meeting between 
programmers and software to a mere functional step in the machinery 
of the software industry.”57 In this context, when the terms “beauty” 
and “elegance” are applied to source code they are merely synonyms 
for “speed” and “efficiency.”58 This perception of the programming 
process colors many court opinions and legal academic writing in this 
area.59 
																																								 																				
 52. PIÑEIRO, supra note 39, at 31. 
 53. Aaron Kozbelt et al., The Aesthetics of Software Code: A Quantitative Exploration, 6 
PSYCHOL. OF AESTHETICS, CREATIVITY, AND THE ARTS 57, 58 (2012). 
 54. PIÑEIRO, supra note 39, at 31. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 8, at 687 (“The creative part of writing a 
good program may come in finding a faster, more efficient alternative to an obvious but slower 
way of performing the function.”); Burk, Patenting Speech, supra note 41, at 120 “The goal of a 
programmer designing software is to achieve functional results in an efficient way. While there 
may be elements of individual style present in program design, even those style elements 
concern issues of industrial design, e.g., the choice of one or another programming technique or 
the clarity (or obscurity) of the functional purpose of a portion of the program.”). 
 59. Comput. Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The 
essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further complicates the task of distilling its 
idea from its expression.”); Ambrose, supra note 47, at 17 (“Computer programs…have 
negligible value outside of their functionality.”). Samuelson, supra note 8, at 728 (“When 
Congress decided in 1980 to extend copyright protection to computer programs, it neglected to 
consider the problems raised by the utilitarian nature of computer programs.”); Burk, Method 
and Madness in Copyright, supra note 41, at 614 (“For our purposes here this is significant 
because construction of a device by writing text is equivalent to constructing the device by 
soldering metal or molding polymers: both will execute processes to produce a determined, 
monovalent outcome.”). Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights 
Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV., 1746, 1772 (2011) [hereinafter Samuelson, Uneasy Case] 
(“In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. [977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)] the Ninth Circuit 
embraced Altai’s conceptualization of computer programs as utilitarian works that were eligible 
for only thin copyright protection.”); Samuelson et al., Manifesto Concerning Legal Protection, 
supra note 40, at 2327 (“Once one understands that programs are machines that happen to have 
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If this perception were correct, one would expect that now 
decades into a freestanding software industry, and the innumerable 
text written attempting to objectify the coding process, the process of 
programming should be better optimized with programs released on 
schedule and without functional bugs or vulnerabilities. If true, then a 
computer should be able to program itself after receiving only the 
vaguest description of the function it should perform. “Legend has it[, 
however,] that no programming project has ever been finished on 
time or within budget, but [there is no need to] go to such an extreme 
to admit that many applications cost more than planned and arrive 
late.”60 
If we look at programming from the opposite perspective, 
however, from the beginning of its conception—the desire for a 
program to perform a task—to the finished product, we see something 
very different, i.e. a software program from the perspective of a 
programmer is something very different from the perspective of the 
end user. It is true that some software engineers view their trade as 
that of a craft no different from a bricklaying. This view, however, is 
in the minority.61  
2. How Programmers Interact with Computer Programs 
It is true that “[p]rogrammers write code in order to cause the 
computer to function in desired ways. But modern computer 
programs are written in a form, usually textual, that is also meant to 
be manipulated and understood by human beings. For a programmer 
to understand what she herself is writing, and to incorporate code that 
others have written, and to simply learn how to program with greater 
facility and on a larger more complex scale code has been made 
legible to people. While a computer system may compile or interpret 
code, it is important to the nature of code that it is interpreted by 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
been constructed in the medium of text, it becomes easier to understand that writing programs is 
an industrial design process akin to the design of physical machines.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Convergence in the Law of Software Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 1, 7 (1995) (“[C]omputer 
programs are written for a utilitarian purpose. Expression in the code or structure and 
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people as well.”62 “Programmers are extremely conscious of language 
style, of coding idioms that not only ‘get the job done’, but do it in a 
way that is particularly appropriate for that language.”63  
In fact, Donald Knuth, widely considered the founder of 
computer science as an independent discipline, suggested: 
Let us change our traditional attitude to the construction of programs: 
Instead of imagining that our main task is to instruct a computer what to 
do, let us concentrate rather on explaining to human beings what we want 
a computer to do. There is one very good reason to why code should be 
readable, namely that it is often the only document that a programmer can 
resort to when faced with the maintenance of old programs.64 
In the introduction to his series of books entitled The Art of 
Programming, Dr. Knuth writes “[t]he process of preparing programs 
for a digital computer is especially attractive because it not only can 
be economically and scientifically awarding, it can also be an 
aesthetic experience much like composing poetry or music.”65 Dr. 
Knuth is known for “teaching [programming] as an art rather than a 
science.”66 Responding to a question in a lecture he recalled “reading 
the program SOAP from Stan Poley: ‘absolutely beautiful. Reading it 
was just like hearing a symphony, because every instruction was sort 
of doing two things and everything came together gracefully.’ He also 
remembers reading the code to a compiler written by Alan Perlis and 
others: ‘plodding and excruciating to read, because it just didn’t 
possess any wit whatsoever. It got the job done, but its use of the 
computer was very disappointing.’”67 
“Programmers have a creator-creation relationship to their code, 
and whether that code fulfils someone else’s expectations (users, 
managers, for instance) is only an aspect of that relationship. Their 
code reveals a number of things about them, such as their skills, their 
technical preferences, their beliefs about what can be done with 
software, in a word, about the kind of programmers they are.”68 
“[P]ersonal styles appear at all levels of the programming effort: from 
those held in less esteem (coding) to those considered truly creative 
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(software design).”69 “Programmers respond to software, or relate to 
it, in aesthetic ways, that is, they do things with it that one only does 
with aesthetically pleasing objects.”70 While it is true that “beauty” 
and “elegance” in code can relate to the speed and efficiency of the 
compiled program, “[s]implicity in programming can be achieved in . 
. . many different ways.”71 “The fact that beauty appears more quickly 
discernible [among programmers] than correctness suggests [not 
only] that aesthetic-laden evaluative processes may drive judgment 
and decision making about software code” but that there is not a 
direct correlation between “beauty” and “elegance” of source code 
and its objective efficiency.72 “In other words, it may simply be more 
efficient for programmers to rely on aesthetic intuitions about code 
than to laboriously understand its details, when writing or revising 
code.”73 
In sum, while as users of software we view it as utilitarian and 
function, its creation is not a scientifically objective process, like 
solving a math problem.74 “[T]here is no programming methodology 
today, nor any software development management methodology, that 
is the undisputed best one, let alone one that could be properly called 
scientifically correct. Neither the software industry nor the academics 
know how to make sure programming projects produce the results 
expected, in the expected time.”75 “[P]rogrammers face different 
alternatives when they are programming and that these alternatives 
cannot be, so to speak, calculated away. They require a personal 
choice from the programmer.”76 “[T]here is no way to know which 
alternative is the right one, that, in fact, there is no right alternative to 
choose. All options are equally valid, and the programmer must 
simply choose one. . . . [T]hese alternatives, even if they are equally 
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valid from the user’s perspective, are not equal to the programmer. 
Hence, using long variable names, for instance, is not the same as 
using short variable names, choosing one alternative or the other will 
not change the functionality of the application but it says something 
about the programmer.”77 The writerly aspects of programming 
should not be dismissed. Just as “[n]o literary writer can use language 
merely as a stopgap device with which to compose an artwork that is 
not in itself language” writing code is not just the evil necessary to 
achieve the function, but it is itself the function and something 
fundamentally different than circuits, gears and levels, which have no 
ability to do anything other than what they long existed to do.78 
D. What Becomes a Computer Program 
It is important to draw the distinction between computer code—
something that simultaneously says something and does it—and 
programming. The word program comes from “the Greek 
programma, a written notice to the public. It indicates a procedural 
way of doing things, which is important for understanding the 
computational process more broadly: the logic of “if something then 
something else,” for instance.79 Coding is but a phase of programming 
process.80 “[T]he code is the last part of the programmer’s action and 
the first part of the computer’s, which makes it the interface between 
the worlds of human thinking and computer logic.”81  
Programming is an iterative process. “Since the inception of 
computers (or more broadly, calculating machines), their creators 
aimed to either solve or accelerate the processes whose ‘traditional’ 
implementation would take a lot longer and require considerable 
resources. However, to make this possible, the thought that it could be 
done had to come first. This thought had to be turned into an idea—
how to achieve this (an algorithm). The idea had to be presented in a 
form that could be converted into commands for a computer (the 
source code in a programming language) and then translated into a set 
of machine statements that a computer could execute (executable 
program).”82 Thus, programming has been described as “a human 
activity that is a great challenge, involving the design of machine 
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behavior that can assist, and at times replace, humans in tasks of 
intellectual nature.”83  
Broadly speaking, the programming process can be broken down 
into a number of components. The first is the development of an 
algorithm—creating a method for the task to be performed.84 This can 
take the form of a guiding document called a “technical 
specification,” which describe the technical characteristics the 
program will have.85 Second is describing this algorithm within a 
programming paradigm that identifies its architecture from which a 
programming language can be chosen as well as other decisions can 
be made such as data structures, identifying the correct libraries of 
subroutes or classes.86 Software architecture refers “the organization 
of a software system as a collection of components, connections 
between the components, and constraints on how the components 
interact.”87 Once the design documents mirrors the technical 
specifications coding can begin.88 If the design is sufficiently 
rigorous, then the coding should be nothing more “typing the 
necessary commands so as to construct the design in a form that a 
computer (or microprocessor) understanding.”89  
Based on this structure it is easy to see why “[p]rogrammers 
sometimes give designing a higher status than coding, reasoning that 
it requires more knowledge to be able to solve the problem (design) 
than to translate the solution into commands (coding). In fact, 
occasionally, project organizations differentiate between designers 
and coders, the former ones generally being better paid. Also, the 
word ‘coders’ can be used pejoratively, meaning poor 
programmers.”90 For our purposes, it becomes important not to 
elevate the source code itself as the pinnacle of the protected text. We 
should not discount the architecture and design documents from 
which route code is written as simply unprotected diagrams of 
function or structure. 
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1. Technical Specifications, Design, and Degrees of 
Abstraction 
Stepping back, it is also helpful to understand what is meant by 
an algorithm. An algorithm can be defined as “a set of rules, 
statements, descriptions of successive operations or constraints that 
determine the sequence of execution of individual operations in order 
to obtain a certain result.”91 The first requirement of an algorithm is 
that “the actions to be carried out during the execution of an 
algorithm cannot contain any ambiguities or default element.”92 The 
second requirement is that it consist of discrete steps. “A rule can 
aspire to be an algorithm, if it describes the required actions as a 
sequence of consecutive basic steps. A ‘basic step’ means a simple 
task whose execution does not require any additional explanation.”93 
“The third requirement which a recipe has to meet in order to be 
regarded as an algorithm concerns its finite character. Finite means 
guaranteeing the completion of the execution of a recipe after a finite 
number of steps.”94 “The last requirement we set when we want to 
check that a given recipe should be regarded as an algorithm is a 
requirement of generality. An algorithm should allow a certain class 
of problems to be solved or a certain group of goals to be achieved—
and not one problem or one goal.”95 
Once the technical specifications are defined for the task, the 
next step is to translate the algorithm into a task that can be performed 
by a computer. In this context, the algorithm provides specificity for 
the task to be performed, but remains several layers of abstraction 
from any activity that could be performed by a computer. Before 
discussing the translation of the algorithm into specific software 
design documents, it might be helpful to outline these levels of 
abstraction. At its most basic level, “a computer stores instructions 
and data in memory as a collection of electrical charges.”96 We 
commonly represent these charges in a binary manner—on and off, or 
1 and 0. Each charge is referred to as a bit and a string of four charges 
is a digit and eight is a byte.97 Since strings of binary data can quickly 
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become unwieldly, binary data is more commonly presented as 
hexadecimal integers that compacts large binary strings.98  
Now a computer, or more particularly a microprocessor, operates 
by receiving an input in binary form—for example a key stroke, a 
mouse click, a sensor trigger, or simply the passing of time, performs 
a process on that input and provide an output. It is this basic 
functionality that we can refer to as machine code—or code in its 
machine language—consisting of the most rudimentary sequence of 
binary data processed. Now each processor will have its own set of 
instructions for its basic operation, which is referred to as Instruction 
Set Architecture (“ISA”).99 Because families of microprocessors will 
have their own unique ISA, when source code is compiled many 
times it must be compiled to be compatible with a particular 
microprocessor’s ISA.100 In this way, to some extent, the same source 
code can be compiled differently so that it can work with different 
hardware architectures.101  
Above the ISA level is a specific program in its assembly 
language.102 This is the program in its post-complied state as installed 
on a system to perform the function of the computer. A program in its 
assembly language, however, is not strictly binary, but instead 
“consists of statements written with short mnemonics such as ADD, 
MOV, SUB, and CALL.”103 Assembly language is the oldest 
programming language, and of all languages, bears the closest 
resemblance to native machine language.104 Specifically, “assembly 
language has a one-to-one relationship with machine language: Each 
assembly language instruction corresponds to a single machine-
language instruction.”105 An assembler converts the code from 
assembly language into machine language. While programs can be 
written in assembly, it is not easy.106 
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Above assembly language are higher level languages like C++ 
that we commonly understand as the language used for writing source 
code. These higher level languages have “a one-to-many relationship 
with assembly language and machine language,” meaning that “single 
statement in C++ expands into multiple assembly language or 
machine instructions.”107 For our purposes, this is relevant because it 
highlights the difficulty in decompiling a program in its assembly 
language back to its written source code. Moreover, it underscores the 
uniqueness of the grammar of a programming language in that it must 
have a semantical structure that allows it to be understood by 
programmers and a syntactical structure so that it can be efficiently 
converted to assembly language and perform desired functionality. 
Because of the one-to-many relationship between a programming 
language and its ultimate machine code, all programming languages 
will necessarily have inefficiencies in their translations. So if 
performance—the absence of latency between an input and it 
output—is at a premium, coding as close to the machine level 
becomes more important. 
This hierarchy also helps to emphasize the absence of any one to 
one relationship between the expression of a function in source code 
and the ultimate function performed by a computer. Reviewing the 
assembled code may not necessarily tell you the higher level language 
in which it was coded.108 By way of example, an English translation 
of the Old Testament looks very similar to most people even if the 
source text for translation was Greek or Hebrew. 
Just as source code has a one-to-many relationship with its 
assembled code, the function reflected by the assembled program can 
be obtained using a variety of programming languages. This is 
immediately evident by visiting Rosetta Code website, which 
provides code to perform the same functionality in as many coding 
languages as possible.109 Most programmers will have personal 
preferences for using particular code for a particular task, but most 
similarly would agree that the same task can be coded in anyone of 
the languages that they know. So not only are there many ways to 
code the same functionality in a given language, there are 
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innumerable languages that can be used to code that functionality. 
Even when coding choices become more circumscribed because you 
are coding for compatibility with a particular system—like the 
Windows, Apple, android or a flavor of the Linux operating system—
it seems somewhat naïve to say a programmer so lacks meaningful 
choices in how to express the requisite functionality that functionality 
has merged with the ways of its expression. 
Now that we have an understanding of the degrees of abstraction 
from the creation of the algorithm to the computer actual 
implementation of the instruction, we can return to the design of a 
program. Once a programmer has defined the algorithm, the 
programmer must next define a strategy for implementing the 
algorithm on a computer—i.e., choose a programing paradigm. A 
programming paradigm is a way of programming.110 “We can think of 
a paradigm as a modeling technique particularly adjusted to problem 
solving in a computing environment.”111 While a programming 
paradigm is different than a programming language, different 
languages lend themselves better to different paradigms. An easy way 
to understand how programmers write in different paradigms is 
simply to look at how different paradigms are described: 
• Imperative programming: defines computation as 
statements that change a program state 
• Procedural or structured programming: specifies the steps 
the program must take to reach the desired state 
• Declarative programming: defines computation logic 
without defining its control flow 
• Functional programming: treats computation as the 
evaluation of mathematical functions and avoids state and 
mutable data 
• Object-oriented programming (OOP): organizes programs 
as objects: data structures consisting of datafields and 
methods together with their interactions 
• Event-driven programming: the flow of the program is 
determined by events, such as sensor outputs or user actions 
(mouse clicks, key presses) or messages from other programs 
or threads 
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• Automata-based programming: a program, or part, is 
treated as a model of a finite state machine or any other 
formal automaton112 
While some programming languages lend themselves to multiple 
programming paradigms, most are optimized to program within a 
particular paradigm.113 To understand this let’s look at what a 
program does. Programs compute, they do not deduce. “To compute 
we start from a given expression and, according to a fixed set of rules 
(the program) generates a result. . . . To deduce we start from a 
conjecture and, according to a fixed set of rules (the axioms and 
inference rules), try to construct a proof of the conjecture. So 
computation [what the finish program does] is mechanical and 
requires no ingenuity, while deduction is a creative process.”114 As 
Dr. Seale thought experiment shows, computers act based on the 
syntax presented, but they do not understand what they are doing.  
Consistent with the way computers operate, programs divide the 
world into two parts—data and operations on data. “Data is static and 
immutable, except as the operations may change it. The procedures 
and functions that operate on data have no lasting state of their own; 
they’re useful only in their ability to affect data.”115 Simply, in 
response to data received a function is performed causing data to be 
output.116  
The programming language C for example is a procedural 
programming language.117 “The language may offer various kinds of 
support for organizing data and functions, but it won’t divide the 
world any differently. Functions and data structures are the basic 
elements of design.”118 C++, by contrast, is an object oriented 
programming language, which is a prevalent paradigm for the reasons 
discussed below. “Object-oriented programming doesn’t so much 
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dispute this view of the world as restructure it at a higher level. It 
groups operations and data into modular units called objects and lets 
you combine objects into structured networks to form a complete 
program. In an object-oriented programming language, objects and 
object interactions are the basic elements of design.”119  
2. Object-Oriented Programming and Writing Code 
While this discussion of programming paradigms may seem like 
the weeds, object oriented programming paradigms that organize data 
and function into modules with those modules then able to relate to 
one another within a structure is important to our discussion. Object 
oriented programming is not linear, but three dimensional. Rather 
than compared to building a single structure, object oriented 
programming is more akin to urban planning where different 
structures are needed with different tasks expected to occur in each 
with means for data to move between structures, but not always in the 
same order or by the same route. This paradigm not only allow for the 
creation of extremely complex programs and allows numerous 
programmers to simultaneously work on a program, but it also allows 
modules build for one program to be reused in different programs 
assuming the data and function of the module can communicate with 
the modules of the new city (continuing our urban planning analogy).  
For a given module to be added to a structure it must be able to 
communicate with the data and modules in the new architecture. This 
is not an issue of programming language—simply because a module 
is written in C++ does not mean it can meaningfully communicate 
with any other module written in that language. While not completely 
analogous, this is somewhat akin to idioms of speech. People in the 
United States and the UK both speak English, but many times 
meaning is lost where a word or phrase to a Londoner invokes a 
different meaning of function to an American, like when asked in a 
British sandwich shop whether you want salad on your sandwich. 
So let’s step back again. Source code written in a language like 
C++ or JAVA can be written on a piece of paper. It can also be 
written on Notepad which is found on any Widows based computer 
and compiled from there to become a functioning program. Typically, 
however, programs are written using Software Developer Kits (SDK), 
which provides a number of building block that help expedite the 
software development process, including frameworks, and libraries of 
common tasks along with a debugger (finding errors in your code), a 
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compiler and other tools. An Integrated Development Environment 
(IDE) collects the tools of SDK within a single Graphic User 
Interface (GUI). To utilize the shared functionality requires that the 
programmer conform to naming convention the SDK’s Application 
Program Interface (API), i.e. if a programmer want to utilize routine 
functionality the code must call the functionality by its right name. 
Using our analogy, if I ask for salad on my sandwich in London it 
will come with lettuce and tomato, but the likely response at a 
Subway in Los Angeles would be a confused stare. This is precisely 
what was at issue in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.120 By 
copying how routine tasks are called when using JAVA’s SDK, 
programmers already familiar with programming in JAVA could 
easily create applications for Google’s android operating system in 
the android SDK. by changing how the routine task is performed, 
however, android avoids the “write once run anywhere” requirement 
for a royalty free license to Oracle’s copyright on the JAVA 
programming language.121 
Utilizing an object-oriented programming paradigm and utilizing 
accepted naming conventions allow functionality written for one 
application to be used in another. One of the most ubiquitous 
examples of such a module is MySQL, an open source database 
utilized in innumerable free and commercial programs.122 Oracle, 
which owns MySQL, distributes the program under GNU General 
Public License (GPL).123 This licenses entities and individuals to 
royalty-free use of MySQL. If, however, MySQL is made part of a 
publicly distributed program, the license requires that the source code 
for the module, including any modification be made publicly 
available.124 This requirement, however, does not preclude an owner 
from selling a program that utilizes MySQL.125 If a user does not want 
to conform to the GNU GPL, Oracle offer other licensing options, but 
they are not royalty-free.126 The GNU GPL is one of several software 
licensing options available that utilize intellectual property law to 
accomplish the goals of Free and Open Source Software movement, 
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and are commonly referred to as copyleft licenses.127 The alternative, 
less “political” licensing scheme are “attribution only” licenses like 
the one governing the Apache, the most widely used webserver 
program.128 Google distributes android under the Apache 2.0 license 
that allows anyone to “take android, significantly modify it, and not 
release the source code to others.”129 
What is relevant here to our discussion is the norm within 
programming of using existing tools to speed up routine processes 
and the willingness of programmers to make available the source 
code of tools they have developed that might ease the burden on their 
toiling brethren. The intent and expectation of making source code 
freely available is not only that the tool will be helpful to the 
community, but also that the community will review comment and 
improve the tool for the greater good. The website GitHub is a good 
example of such a repository of code.130  
E. The Community of Programmers 
The community underpinning associated with coding is one 
reason for long confrontational relationship between programmers 
and intellectual property law. A bit of history may be helpful here. 
Historically software and hardware were tied together, as they remain 
with Apple.131 Many tie the development of an independent software 
industry to the time when Bill Gates and Paul Allen broke with IBM 
to make Microsoft an independent company writing software for a 
generic computer and not simply programs for personal computers 
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 129. Clark D. Assay, A Case for the Public Domain, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 28 (2013). 
 130. GITHUB, http://bit.do/GitHub (“How people build software. Millions of developers 
use GitHub to build personal projects, support their businesses, and work together on open 
source technologies.”). 
 131. Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 59, at 1750-51 (discussing Stephen Breyer’s 
then 40 year old article questioning the prudence of copyright protection for software at a time 
when software was typically tied to a unique customer’s singular application). 
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manufactured by IBM.132 For our purposes, however, the history of 
the Unix operating system is more relevant.133  
UNIX was developed in the late 1960s early 1970s by AT&T 
engineers during their free time.134 These engineers consulted 
extensively with professors at University of California at Berkeley. 
AT&T obtained a copyright in UNIX and then licensed its use for a 
nominal fee to Berkeley as well as a number of other public and 
private entities.135 Thereafter, as a result of an antitrust consent decree 
with the Department of Justice, AT&T agreed refrain from pursuing 
any computer-related businesses. During this period, the professors at 
Berkeley, their students, and other enthusiasts continued to develop 
and refine UNIX cooperatively.136 In 1982, when the restrictions 
imposed by the consent decree were lifted, AT&T attempted to 
enforce its rights in UNIX. 
The attempt by AT&T to privatize UNIX qualifies as one of the most 
notorious enclosures saluting the dawn of the ‘information age’. It had a 
resolute impact on the collective mindset of the programmers’ community 
and fueled their skepticism towards big corporations and the intellectual 
property regime. AT&T’s bid to own UNIX demonstrated that copyright 
can be used to rob authors of their work, the very opposite of the 
ideological justification for the law. Hackers thus realized that the 
collective authorship of software developers has to be shielded from the 
legal powers instituted in a single party by copyright law.137  
In response to AT&T efforts, programmers worked to strip all 
remnants of AT&T’s UNIX operating system from their current 
UNIX flavor, and this spawned the formation of the Free Software 
Foundation.138 The Foundation’s version of UNIX called GNU, 
(recursively) standing for “GNU’s Not UNIX.”139 The need for legal 
																																								 																				
 132. Soderberg, supra note 127, at 18.  
 133. CRAMER, supra note 37, at 121 (“The Unix operating system which runs on almost 
any kind of hardware is a prime example of software as an abstraction from hardware.”); Cox, 
supra note 4, at 21 (“Behind this crucial issue of access to information is the history of the 
sharing of source code, itself rooted in the history of the UNIX operating system and its 
precarious position between promises of the public domain and commercial enterprise, 
corresponding to the differences between free software and open source development.”). 
 134. Unix System Laboratories v. Berkeley Software, 832 F. Supp. 790, 794 (D. NJ 1993). 
 135. Id. at 793. 
 136. Soderberg, supra note 127, at 19 (“[I]n 1982, AT&T was relieved from the anti-trust 
ruling, which had prevented the company from entering the computer business. The company 
soon began to enforce ownership rights over UNIX. By then the operating system had been 
extended and rewritten many times over by students, scientists and enthusiasts collaborating 
across institutions and corporations”). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 23. 
 139. Id. at 19. 
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protection for their shared work to ensure that their work remained 
open and free was quickly realized when a programmer who had 
contributed code to this version sold his code to a third party who 
decided to assert ownership over the code.140 This “experience 
contributed to the creation of the General Public License. The 
nickname for GPL is telling; ‘Copyleft-All Rights Reversed.’”141 In 
words of its founder, Richard Stallman: “Copyleft uses copyright law, 
but flips it over to serve the opposite purpose: instead of a means of 
privatizing software, it becomes a means of keeping software free.”142  
Over the years, many versions of the UNIX operating system 
have been released, the most famous being LINUX, which Linus 
Torvald single handedly started in his “garage.”143 Shortly thereafter, 
programmers began to flock to LINUX.144 This spawned the 
continuing battle between computer programs as property and 
software as a service. The debate about whether the public good is 
best served by proprietary programs built with capital as opposed to 
open source programs written with the passion of their programmers 
continues today.145 What is important for our purpose, is that both 
proprietary and freely distributed programs need rules covering their 
use in order to further their political end, and today those rules mostly 
come from the Copyright Act. The distinction between the two 
regimes is the ability of the programming community to look under 
the hood—view the source code that achieves the functionality. 
Errors in programming are endemic and can lead to untold problems. 
Here, the open source movement has the advantage as evident from 
their refrain “given enough eyeballs, all [software] bugs are 
shallow.”146 
Finally, the application of intellectual property law, and in 
particular copyright law, alone does not tip the balance in favor of 
some over others. A program or even a programming language, no 
matter its merit, has no value until it is adopted and used. The 
decisions by Oracle to continue to distribute JAVA under a royalty-
																																								 																				
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Soderberg, supra note 127, at 19. 
 143. Id. at 23. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 26 (“Linus Torvald’s have [sic] offered his own explanation to the GNU/Linux 
phenomenon. The competitive edge of free software over proprietary software owes to the 
higher motivation of its authors. Speaking at a Linux User Group meeting in San Francisco, he 
stated: ‘Those other operating systems aren’t bad because of [technical detail] A or technical 
detail B. Those systems are bad because the people don’t care[.]’”). 
 146. Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 73 OHIO ST. L.J., no. 10 (2013), at 1, 
14. 
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free license, and similarly for Microsoft to make its Visual Basic IDE, 
available royalty free are driven in large part to promote their use and 
maintain the viability of the programming language they each 
support. Someone could conceive and create the most efficient 
programming language of all time, but if its use is conditioned on a 
restrictive and expensive license, its adoption would be unlikely. This 
balance is obviously grasped by the owners of some of the most 
successful game apps, which make them free to play until you are 
hooked and they then start charging. 
The enforcement of intellectual property laws, or the lack 
thereof, cannot be seen as the reason for the success of any language, 
operating system, or program over another. The best example of this 
fact is Microsoft, which, with the adoption of its operating system, 
began giving away application that could run on that system to 
capture the word processing, spreadsheet, graphics and browser 
application market. The risk to competition greater than the 
inefficient application of intellectual property law to computer 
programs is the network itself. Like in computer hardware, software 
today is built upon standards. While those who control the 
foundational elements of these standards, like a system’s operating 
system, are highly motivated for third parties to write applications to 
make they systems more desirable to consumers—think of the IOS or 
android—the complexity of these systems themselves give their 
owners enormous power over economy. Think what would happen if 
Microsoft decided to patch all versions of its operating system with 
code that turned the system off permanently. Today’s intellectual 
property laws cannot require Apple, Microsoft or Google to continue 
to make available their operating systems upon which so many other 
systems depend, but existing law intellectual property laws effectively 
prevent the creation of perfect substitutes to protect the public good if 
they decided to turn them off.147 
II.  COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Congress May Enact Laws To Promote Science and the 
Useful Arts 
																																								 																				
 147. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“Franklin claims that whether or not the programs can be rewritten, there are a limited ‘number 
of ways to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to run the vast body of Apple-
compatible software’, Brief of Appellee at 20. . . . Franklin may wish to achieve total 
compatibility with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but 
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat 
metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.”). 
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Copyright protection can be simply summarized as granting 
rights for how something is expressed in exchange for what is 
expressed. Stated another way, copyright does not protect what you 
teach, but how you teach it.148  
Copyright protection as we know it is not guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution.149 Instead the founding fathers saw the 
utility of affording Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts[] by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries,”150 believing that “[t]he States cannot separately make 
effectual provisions for [the protection of authors or inventors].”151 
Congress’ exercised its right “[t]o Promote the Progress of 
Science[152] by securing for . . . Authors the exclusive Right to their 
Writings” by enacting our current copyright scheme, and Congress 
acted “[t]o Promote the Progress of useful Arts by securing for . . . 
																																								 																				
 148. Brief English Sys. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1931) (“Once concede that the 
defendant Owen could lawfully write, or write about, any system of shorthand his ability 
permitted and his book has nothing of consequence in common with what is covered by the 
plaintiff’s copyrights. The manner of treatment is substantially dissimilar and original. Without 
proof of the kind of appropriation mentioned above, the plaintiff has no cause of action.”). 
 149. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1972) (“The clause thus describes both 
the objective which Congress may seek and the means to achieve it.”). 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. While early on some questions existed about whether 
purely aesthetic works fell within the meaning of this constitutional provision, the Supreme 
Court resolved that issue in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211 (1953). Similarly, thereafter, 
courts have repeatedly judged themselves incompetent to judge the quality or creativity of an 
aesthetic work. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1994). 
As Justice Holmes explained, ‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the 
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their 
very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the 
new language in which their author spoke.  
Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (circus posters 
have copyright protection)); cf. Yankee Publ’g Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 
280 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Leval, J.) (“First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who 
speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.”) (trademark case). 
 151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). Four years before the ratification of the 
Constitution, the Continental Congress passed a resolution recommending that the several states 
enact laws securing to authors and publishers of new books the “exclusive right of printing, 
publishing and vending” such new book for a period of up to 28 years. 8 JOURNALS OF 
CONGRESS: CONTAINING THEIR PROCEEDINGS FROM NOV. 2, 1782 TO NOV. 1, 1783 (Folwell’s 
Press 1800). 
 152. “The ‘Progress of Science’ . . . refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread of 
knowledge and learning.’” Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 324 (2012); see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Congress’ Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1, 47-53 (2002). 
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Inventors the exclusive Right to their Discoveries” by adopting our 
patent laws.153  
Consistent with the constitutional intent, the period of 
exclusivity granted authors and inventors is subsidiary to the public 
good the laws are designed to foster, i.e., a means to a public good 
end.154 It has long been recognized that “[t]he sole interest of the 
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly, lie 
in the general benefit derived by the public from the labors of authors. 
Copyright, like a patent is ‘at once the equivalent given by the public, 
benefits bestowed by the genius and mediation and skills of 
individuals and the incentive to further efforts for the same import 
objects.’”155  
Over time, Congress has amended both of these schemes as it 
sees fit to promote dissemination of learning, knowledge and 
discoveries for the public good. If Congress ever deemed either or 
both of these schemes inadequate, it has the constitutional authority to 
scrap the scheme and start anew so long as such scheme includes 
provisions “securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”156  
B. Copyright’s Bargained-For Exchange: Protecting “How 
You Teach” in Exchange for “What You Teach” 
Currently, the two schemes differ somewhat in the manner in 
which each promotes the public good. Recognizing the value and 
importance of prompt public dissemination of discoveries, the patent 
law includes a bargained-for exchange whereby inventors agree to 
																																								 																				
 153. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 3:4 at 3-12.1 (West 2015) (Although 
“[t]he clause uses neither ‘copyright’ nor ‘patent’ . . . science is joined with authors and 
writings, while useful arts is joined with inventors and discoveries.”); Golan, 565 U.S. at 324 
(“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied 
to the progress of science; its patent authority to the progress of useful arts.”). 
 154. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985) (“In contrast, the Government’s 
theory here would make theft, conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of 
statutorily protected rights in copyright. The copyright owner, however, holds no ordinary 
chattel.”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s creative labor. But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); 
Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Copyright is solely a creature of statute; 
whatever rights and remedies exist do so only because Congress provided them. See Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). Thus, as there is no 
constitutional right to copyright registration, the Register’s refusal to register Darden’s claim 
cannot be “contrary to constitutional right” as it must be for section 706(2)(B) to apply.”). 
 155. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 128 (1932) (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 
U.S. 322, 327-28 (1856)). 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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publicly disclose their inventions shortly after first exploitation in 
exchange for the exclusive right to make, sell or use their invention 
for a specified period of time. Significantly, federal law does not 
foreclose common law protections for inventors unwilling to 
participate in this exchange, allowing them to maintain the secrecy of 
their inventions and prosecuting and recovering damages against 
those who misappropriate the secrets of their invention. 157 
As is the case in patent law, Congress’ original formulations of 
federal copyright law limited protection to works presented to the 
public, leaving common law protections available for unpublished 
works.158 But unlike patent law, Congress did not circumscribe the 
time in which the creator needed to publish after creation. Following 
endless contortions to define what constituted a publication in 
differing media, Congress, in its 1976 Copyright Act, scrapped the 
publication requirement, but not out of any reconsideration of the 
importance of creators making their work available to the public.159 
Even without the express publication requirement, the Supreme Court 
continues to recognize that copyright’s overriding purpose is to 
induce the dissemination of ideas and expression.160  
																																								 																				
 157. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret law can 
coexist with federal patent law); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
146 (1989) (“As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and 
certain limitations upon the exercise of that power. Congress may not create patent monopolies 
of unlimited duration, nor may it ‘authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)). 
 158. See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1987). Arguably, the difficulty in recognizing what constituted a publication with newer 
technologies was an impetus for dispensing with the publication requirement. Id. 
 159. Curiously, the Supreme Court, construing the 1976 Copyright Act in Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2002), cited that lack of a public disclosure requirement as a meaningful 
reason to distinguish its patent jurisprudence from copyright law. Id. at 217. In rejecting 
appellant’s effort to analogize the two schemes, the Court stated “patents and copyrights do not 
entail the same exchange,” indicating that its “references to a quid pro quo [that] typically 
appear in the patent context” are not applicable to copyright. Id. at 216. The Eldred Court states 
“[f]or the author seeking copyright protection, in contrast, disclosure is the desired objective, 
not something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.” Id. The Eldred Court 
continues by drawing the distinction with patent law that “copyright gives the holder no 
monopoly over knowledge,” while “[t]he grant of a patent does prevent full use of being made 
of knowledge.” Id. at 217. While the Eldred Court acknowledges that the copyright holder 
obtains something less than a monopoly over his creation, the Court does not view this as ceding 
the idea underlying their expression to the public as quid pro quo for the protection copyright 
affords expression. The Supreme Court’s notion that somehow there is no public dedication of 
the work as a quid pro quo seems inconsistent with its jurisprudence that First Amendment 
protection extends not only to the ability to speak but afford a citizen a constitutional right of 
access to information and the dissemination of ideas. See Patterson, supra note 158, at 2.  
 160. Cf. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. at 326 (2012) (“Evidence from the founding, moreover, 
suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed to creation—was viewed as an appropriate 
364 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.   [Vol. 33 
This distinction between patent and copyright protection, which 
is a holdover from the publication requirement for federal protection, 
creates one of the greatest inefficiencies with applying copyright 
protection to computer software. As currently constructed, someone 
can disseminate their code and have it widely adopted into larger 
systems only later to assert rights and force users into a hostage 
situation whereby the users must either rewrite their code to perform 
the functionality161 without its expression or pay a royalty. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that latches cannot be used 
to shorten the Congressionally mandated limitations period for a 
copyright claim makes this risk more significant.162 
By requiring creators of expressive works to register their works 
within a particular time of public dissemination and identify the 
limitations on use (e.g., free to use with attribution, private, or paid 
royalty requirement), the public knows the restrictions on their use of 
the expression, which furthers the public good. Like all forms of 
expression, price determines use. Many of us watch movies on 
Netflix, paid for by our monthly subscription that we would never 
separately pay for to watch in a theater. In the same way, when 
alternative source code is available to perform a particular function, 
differences in costs and restrictions will play a role in which code is 
adopted. 
In addition to express time limitations, Courts have long 
recognized limitations to authors’ granted monopoly rights under 
copyright law in order to ensure that the law conformed to its 
overarching purpose of furthering public good.163 As Justice Brandeis 
observed nearly 100 years ago in International News Service v. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
means to promote science.”). 
 161. The ability to meticulously change expression to adopt an expression’s idea without 
its function is well recognized in copyright outside the protection for computer programs. 
Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, 758 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A corollary of the 
‘sameness’ requirement is that ‘[c]opying deleted or so disguised as to be unrecognizable is not 
copying.’” (quoting See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 162. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1977 (2014) (“Congress’ 
time provisions secured to authors a copyright term of long duration, and a right to sue for 
infringement occurring no more than three years back from the time of suit. That regime leaves 
‘little place’ for a doctrine that would further limit the timeliness of a copyright owner’s suit.”). 
 163. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copyright 
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (“There are situations, 
nevertheless, in which strict enforcement of this monopoly would inhibit the very ‘Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is intended to promote.”;) Mathews Conveyer Co. v. 
Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (“fair use . . . may be made of copyrighted 
material based on the principle that subsequent workers in the same field are not to be deprived 
of all use thereof . . . otherwise, the progress of science and the useful arts would be unduly 
obstructed.”). 
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Associated Press: “The general rule of law is, that the noblest of 
human production knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and 
ideas become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air 
in common use.”164 Early court decisions formulated a distinction 
between what is expressed and how it is expressed, which many times 
is given the short hand idea/expression dichotomy.165 Recognizing the 
paramount purpose of the public good, copyright, in a manner similar 
to the patent scheme, encourages and rewards authors for their 
creations by allowing them to profit from their original expression of 
their creations in exchange for leaving to the public good the use what 
has been expressed. Judge Learned Hand, discussing the 
idea/expression dichotomy, stated that a plaintiff’s “copyright did not 
cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its contents went 
to some extent into the public domain. We have to decide how much, 
and we are aware as anyone that the line, wherever it is drawn, will 
seem arbitrary, that it no excuse for not drawing it.”166  
This distinction long recognized by the court between what is 
expressed and how it is expressed is codified as part of the 1976 
amendment in Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. Importantly, and 
consistent with existing jurisprudence, Congress codified that “what 
is expressed” is much broader than simply an “idea,” but also 
includes the underlying “procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in 
which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such 
work.”167 Contrary to the conclusion of some court and 
commentators, Section 102(b) is not intended to demarcate copyright 
from patent protection168 or to enact an exclusion from what 
																																								 																				
 164. Int’l News Servs. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 165. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Shakespeare’s 
‘ideas’ [are no more] capable of monopoly [than] Einstein’s Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin’s 
theory of the Origin of Species.”).  
 166. Id. at 122. 
 167. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Golan, 565 U.S. at 328 (“The idea/expression dichotomy 
is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)[.]”); see M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 
434 (4th Cir. 1986) (“In effect, what Congress intended in this subsection was simply a 
codification of the statement made by the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 207 that 
copyright protection extended ‘only to the expression of the idea—not the idea,’ thus 
distinguishing between ‘idea’ and ‘expression,’ between ‘methodology or processes’ and 
‘writings,’ and, in effect, between patentability and copyrightability.). 
 168. Lexmark Intern. v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“This provision embodies the common-law idea-expression dichotomy that distinguishes the 
spheres of copyright and patent law.”); Samuelson, Functionality and Expression, supra note 
50, at 18 (“A third proposition about § 102(b) that should be uncontroversial is that procedures, 
processes, systems, and methods of operation are excluded from the scope of copyright 
protection in part to maintain a balance between the role of copyright in protecting authorial 
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otherwise would be protected by copyright law.169 Simply, at the time 
Section 102(b) was enacted it was well understood that like copyright, 
“one may not patent an idea.”170 As stated in the Committee Notes 
accompanying this subsection “‘Section 102(b) . . . in no way 
enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the 
present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single 
federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between 
expression and idea remains unchanged.’”171 As applied to software 
protection, Congress continued “‘Section 102(b) is intended, among 
other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the 
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and 
that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not 
within the scope of the copyright law.’”172 
Importantly, this distinction has never been limited to aesthetic 
ideas and their expression.173 In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court 
stated that it found “nothing in the copyright statute to support the 
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible 
for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such 
a limitation into the copyright law.”174 In fact, two-thirds of the 
original scope of copyright protection as enacted in 1790 consisted of 
maps and charts, which “are valued to the extent they offer useful 
organizations of facts.”175  
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
expression and the role of patent law in providing protection to inventions in the useful arts.”). 
 169. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1339 (rejecting Google’s argument “there is a two-step 
copyrightability analysis, wherein Section 102(a) grants copyright protection to original works, 
while Section 102(b) takes it away if the work has a functional component.”).  
 170. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
 171. M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5670 (1976)). 
 172.  Id. at 434-35 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5670 (1976)). 
 173. “Blueprints for large buildings (more committee work), instruction manuals for 
repairing automobiles, used car value guides, dictionaries, encyclopedias, maps . . . are routinely 
copyrighted, and challenges to the validity of these copyrights are routinely rejected.” American 
Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 978 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Educational 
Testing Services v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986) (Scholastic Aptitude Test); CCC 
Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(list of used-car prices); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995) (terms describing 
groups of animals). See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (including “architectural plans” within the 
definition of “pictoral, graphic and sculptural works” that are copyrightable); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.15.2 (1989) (discussing copyright protection 
for computer programs)); see also General Drafting Co. v. Andrews, 37 F.2d 54, 55 (2d Cir. 
1930) (“Automobile maps similar to those in suit are clearly the subject of copyright...”); Edwin 
K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co, 542 F.2d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming 
protection of instruction in accounting book). 
 174. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). 
 175. American Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 978-79 (recognizing that a taxonomy of dental 
procedures and nomenclature is entitled to copyright protection). The original codification of the 
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The fact that the use of a machine is necessary for expression has 
long been held to be irrelevant.176 Copyright jurisprudence has rarely 
hesitated to recognize that Congress intended its statute to reach any 
form of expression, whether fanciful, factual, practical, or scientific. 
By not reaching the idea itself or the expressed “procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,” a 
copyright does not protect an article’s usefulness as a “procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”177 Moreover, with respect to physical articles, if the 
article’s usefulness cannot be separated from creative expression, then 
no copyright protection would attach—think of a design for a chair or 
an article of clothing.178 An apt example is Brandir Intern., Inc. v. 
Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., where an artist modified an existing 
sculpture to make it more compatible as a bike rack.179 While the 
original sculpture was copyrightable, the modified version was not 
because it had become simply a product of industrial design where 
utility could no longer be separated from its creative expression.180 By 
contrast, where a decorative sculpture could be separated from its 
function as a lamp, the sculpture itself could still be protected by 
copyright.181  
Significantly, this required demarcation between expression and 
usefulness is limited in the Copyright Act to articles that are, or 
incorporate, “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.”182 “Such 
works” are protected by copyright “only if, and only to the extent 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
Copyright Act is at 1 Stat 124.  
 176. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (extending 
copyright protection to photography). 
 177. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 178. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“Since the four Barnhart forms [mannequins] are concededly useful articles, the crucial issue in 
determining their copyrightability is whether they possess artistic or aesthetic features that are 
physically or conceptually separable from their utilitarian dimension.”); Galiano v. Harrah’s 
Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Gianna makes no showing that its 
designs are marketable independently of their utilitarian function as casino uniforms.”); 
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression, supra note 50 (“The overall design of a chair or 
automobile, by contrast, may well have an aesthetic character, but the expression in these 
creations cannot be separated (that is, they are merged) from their utilitarian functions.”). 
 179. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 180. Id. at 1147 (“Had Brandir merely adopted one of the existing sculptures as a bicycle 
rack, neither the application to a utilitarian end nor commercialization of that use would have 
caused the object to forfeit its copyrighted status. Comparison of the RIBBON Rack with the 
earlier sculptures, however, reveals that while the rack may have been derived in part from one 
of more ‘works of art,’ it is in its final form essentially a product of industrial design.”). 
 181. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217 (holding that statute that was part of a lamp was 
copyrightable). 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features 
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of exiting 
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”183 Some argue 
that an ability to separate expression from utility should extend to 
computer programs as well, which would effectively render programs 
unprotectable because they both do (utility) and say (express).184 
Neither the Copyright Act nor case law, however, require such an 
explicit demarcation between utility and expression for non-objects 
like literary works or motion pictures. A simple example proves this 
point. School districts chose algebra textbooks because of their 
perceived utility—the ability to teach students algebra. While such a 
textbook is incapable “of existing independently of” the algebra it 
teaches, no one disputes that the algebra book is protected by 
copyright. Instead, copyright protection would extend to how it 
teaches algebra even though how it teaches is completely interwoven 
with what it teaches. This same reasoning must apply to computer 
programs. While copyright does not protect the functions and 
processes performed by a program, the fact remains that the manner 
in which a program instructs the computer to perform such a function 
or process cannot exist independently from the function or process 
performed. A program simultaneously says what it does and does it, 
but this does not mean that the creative expression of a program is not 
protected. 
The seminal case in this area is Baker v. Selden,185 over which 
much ink has already been spilt. Simply, the plaintiff in Baker held a 
copyright in a book explaining a bookkeeping method and claimed 
blank forms that allowed persons to practice the method described in 
the book—although not similar to those shown in the book— 
infringed the book’s copyright. The Supreme Court summarized the 
case as follows:  
The defendant uses a similar plan so far as results are concerned; but 
makes a different arrangement of the columns, and uses different 
headings. If the complainant’s testator had the exclusive right to the use of 
the system explained in his book, it would be difficult to contend that the 
defendant does not infringe it, notwithstanding the difference in his form 
of arrangement; but if it be assumed that the system is open to public use, 
it seems to be equally difficult to contend that the books made and sold by 
the defendant are a violation of the copyright of the complainant’s book 
																																								 																				
 183. Id. 
 184. Gordon, supra note 34. 
 185. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
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considered merely as a book explanatory of the system. 186 
Stated simply, the issue confronted by Baker is whether a 
copyright protects not only how something is taught but also grants 
rights over the subject of the teaching.187 The Baker Court held it did 
not. “The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the 
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the 
art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other 
is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only 
be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.”188 By way of 
example,  
[t]ake the case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great 
value in the healing art. If the discoverer writes and publishes a book on 
the subject (as regular physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive 
right to the manufacture and sale of the medicine; he gives that to the 
public. If he desires to acquire such exclusive right, he must obtain a 
patent for the mixture as a new art, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.189 
To state another way, “[f]ew ‘how-to’ works are ‘systems’ in 
Baker’s sense. If they were, architectural blueprints could be freely 
copied, although the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. 100-567, 102 Stat. 2854, adds protection for “architectural 
plans” to the statute. Descriptions of how to build or do something do 
not facilitate monopoly of the subject-matter being described, so the 
concern of Baker is not activated.”190  
Commentators debate whether Baker is the foundation of the 
idea/expression dichotomy, even though the Baker Court does not use 
that phraseology.191 Similarly, other have argued that the copyright 
limitation described in Baker reflects patent law exclusive authority 
over process, methods, and compounds. A simpler explanation is 
possible. Copyright protects creative expression and is unconcerned 
																																								 																				
 186. Id. at 100. 
 187. Id. at 101. 
 188. Id. at 105. 
 189. Id. at 102-03. Similarly, the Baker Court continues, “The copyright of a work on 
mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation 
which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as to prevent an 
engineer from using them whenever occasion requires.” Id. at 103. 
 190. American Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 981. 
 191. William Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: A Failed Experiment and a 
Solution to a Dilemma, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 216 (2002) (“The origin of the idea-
expression dichotomy is frequently traced to the Supreme Court’s 1880 decision in Baker v. 
Selden. It is questionable whether the origin is correctly ascribed: the opinion never refers to 
ideas and was decided on the ground of lack of originality.”). 
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with the uniqueness of what is expressed. This is why books about the 
battle at Gettysburg, Einstein’s theory of relativity, how to use 
Windows 10, as well as translation of an ancient text into modern 
English receive copyright protection.192 In each the foundational facts, 
methods, discoveries, ideas, and processes were already known. 
Copyright law reflects the policy decision that to reward authors for 
their original expression of these known ideas serves the public good. 
193 Stated another way, “Einstein’s articles laying out the special and 
general theories of relativity were original works even though many 
of the core equations, such as the famous E=mc2, express ‘facts’ and 
therefore are not copyrightable. Einstein could have explained 
relativity in any of a hundred different ways; another physicist c[an] 
expound the same principles differently.”194  
C. Copyright and Code 
Returning to code, any number of expressions of source code 
can result in the same functionality—maybe even result in identical 
object code to achieve that function. The fact that source code is 
directed to functionality—the same way a work of history is directed 
to facts or an algebra textbook is directed to algebra—does not deny 
its author a copyright to how she expresses that source code to 
achieve that functionality.195 Or stated another way, “‘[t]hat the words 
of a program are used ultimately in the implementation of a process 
should in no way affect their copyrightability.’”196 Specifically, as 
will be developed below, the ability of a programmer to look at 
functionality, observe its structure as it functions, and write her own 
source code based on the observed structured functionality without 
infringing the copyright in the underlying computer program does not 
																																								 																				
 192. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 
(1991) (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. To 
illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose identical poems. Neither 
work is novel, yet both are original and, hence, copyrightable.”). 
 193. The Supreme Court has referred to copyright protections as “the engine of free 
expression.” Harper Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).  
 194. American Dental Ass’n, 126 F.3d at 979. 
 195. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intern., Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 
1983) (“As the CONTU Report aptly put it, ‘One is always free to make the machine do the 
same thing as it would if it had the copyrighted work placed in it, but only by one’s own 
creative effort rather than by piracy.’”) (quoting Final Report of the National Commission on 
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, p. 21 (1978) republished in 3 COMPUTER L.J. 
51 (1981)). 
 196. Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Final Report of the National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, p. 21 (1978) republished in 3 COMPUTER 
L.J. 51 (1981)).  
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mean that the source code itself and its structure are not protected by 
copyright law.197 Here, we must be precise. Like a novel or a film, 
copyright protection of a computer program is not limited to simply 
syntactical copying, but instead should found in the identity in 
structure rather than simply identity of word choices.198  
Copyright law grants authors certain exclusive rights to original 
expression199 of a creative idea. Broken down, copyright law protects 
expression that is original, regardless of whether the facts, ideas, 
processes, or methods described are unique. 200 The time and expense 
																																								 																				
 197. Hutchins v. Zoll Medical Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[C]opyright 
does not protect the technologic process independent of the program that carries it out; that is, 
the copyright covers the way the process is described in the written or electronic form of the 
computer program, but does not cover the process independent of the copyrighted program.”). 
 198. Many courts and commentators argue that the copyright protection for computer 
programs should be limited to syntactical identity—what they refer to as “literal” 
infringement—copying the ordered words themselves. Comput. Associates, 982 F.2d at 712 
(“[It] may well be that the Copyright Act serves as a relatively weak barrier against public 
access to the theoretical interstices behind a program’s source and object codes.”). This 
conclusion is simply contrary to how copyright law is applied in other contexts. For example, 
other literary works in the Ninth Circuit are evaluated based on an “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” 
test. “The ‘extrinsic test’ is an objective comparison of specific expressive elements. ‘[T]he test 
focuses on articulable similarities between [between structural elements like] the plot, themes, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events in two works.’” Cavalier v. 
Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) ((quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures 
& Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The 
‘intrinsic test’ is a subjective comparison that focuses on “whether the ordinary, reasonable 
audience” would find the works substantially similar in the ‘total concept and feel of the 
works.’” Id. (quoting Kouf, 16 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citation omitted)). By 
comparison lists of literal similarities “between the two works are “inherently subjective and 
unreliable,” particularly where the list contains random similarities, and many such similarities 
could be found in very dissimilar works.” Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 
1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 460 (11th Cir. 
1994)); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 590 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[S]uch lists are ‘inherently 
subjective and unreliable,” particularly where “the list emphasizes random similarities scattered 
throughout the works.’) (quoting Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 199. Originality is distinct from the novelty requirement under patent law. In patent law, 
an invention or method of use is denied protection if it is not truly new, i.e. novel. For example, 
a patent can be invalidated if, through the combination of several pieces of prior art, the 
invention or method would be obvious to anyone knowledgeable in that field even if the 
inventor could prove that they were the first to combine these elements. KSR. By contrast, the 
creator of the film Alien v. Predator is not denied a copyright even if it could be proved that it 
would be obvious to any sci-fi film buff to combine these two characters in a movie and express 
the film as it was ultimately made. While the copyright holder arguably must procure the rights 
to the characters of Alien and Predator for use in his film, he would have no copyright in the 
prior works as they contributed to his film, the copyright holder could enforce his copyright as 
to the original expression that flows from the combination of these two works.  
 200. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214 (“They must be original, that is, the author’s tangible 
expression of his idea.”). Secondly, copyright law does not afford protection for all original 
expressions of ideas but only those that are creative. Feist Publications, Inc., 499 U.S. at 350-51 
(“Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be 
copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original section or 
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of compiling data alone does not warrant protection under copyright 
law. Similarly, a mannequin that simply mimics a human body as a 
method for displaying clothing is not protected for its useful purpose, 
but to the extent that its creator adds unique features the mannequin is 
protected even though useful.201 Copyright law reaches only the 
original expression of any creative effort and not the effort itself.  
This protection of original expressions irrespective of the 
uniqueness of the underlying idea can easily be juxtaposed with the 
protections afforded under the patent law. Patent law gives inventors 
rights to tangible use of inventions and discoveries. Like copyright 
law, patent law does not afford protection over an idea or discovery 
itself, but their application or use, i.e. their function.202 This explains 
why patent protection is not available for an abstract idea, a 
mathematical formula or a discovery in nature untethered to a unique 
application or use. 203 Unlike copyright law, patent law focuses on the 
uniqueness of the invention described in an application rather than the 
originality of how the invention is described in the application.  
Thus, rather than affording protections on some sort of 
continuum, patents and copyrights protect fundamentally different 
things. This could not be more stark than in the Copyright Acts 
protection of computer software as the protection of a literary work. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
arrangement of facts but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrangement. In no 
event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.”); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 
F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (data recorded by a machine not copyrightable). 
 201. Compare Pivot Point v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“Applying this test to the Mara mannequin, we must conclude that the Mara face is subject to 
copyright protection. It certainly is not difficult to conceptualize a human face, independent of 
all of Mara’s specific facial features, i.e., the shape of the eye, the upturned nose, the angular 
cheek and jaw structure, that would serve the utilitarian functions of a hair stand and, if proven, 
of a makeup model.”) with Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (“Applying these principles, we are persuaded that since the aesthetic and artistic 
features of the Barnhart forms are inseparable from the forms’ use as utilitarian articles the 
forms are not copyrightable.”). 
 202. Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253 (“‘Just as a patent affords protection only to the 
means of reducing an inventive idea to practice, so the copyright law protects the means of 
expressing an idea; and it is as near the whole truth as generalization can usually reach that, if 
the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of totally different manners, a plurality of 
copyrights may result, and no infringement will exist.’” (quoting Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 
690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926)) (emphasis excluded)). 
 203. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 U.S. 2347 (2014) (“The ‘abstract 
ideas’ category embodies ‘the longstanding rule that “[a]n idea of itself is not patentable.”’” 
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. 
Howard, 80 U.S. 498, 507 (1874)))); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1853) (“A principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as 
no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”); Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 
TEXAS L. REV. 99, 137 (2000) (“In patent, as in copyright, it has long been blackletter law that 
ideas are not patentable, but their physical embodiments are.”). 
2017] SOFTWARE AS TEXT  373 
Simply, a patent is not available for text.204 Moreover, there is simply 
not a place where on original creative expression of a function ends 
and the function itself begins.205 Instead, if there is just one or a few 
practical ways of expressing something, there is little, if any, 
creativity separating the function from its expression, i.e. ways of 
listing names in a phone book. Some refer to this as the merger 
doctrine, where the mode of expressing a fact, idea, process or 
function is one and the same with the fact, idea, process or function 
itself.  
D. Access to the Text of a Computer Program 
Copyright law does not protect a work itself, but protects against 
another copying the expression of a work.206 Stated simply if someone 
breaks into an author’s home and steals their original manuscript or 
other work of art, that theft is not copyright infringement.207 
Similarly, and unlike patent law, if someone completely cut off from 
all of society pens Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone without any 
knowledge or access to the original work, the identity between the 
two works would not matter, assuming, as strange as it seems, that the 
																																								 																				
 204. In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (CCPA 1931) (“The mere arrangement of printed 
matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute ‘any new 
and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ or ‘any new and useful 
improvements thereof,’ as provided in section 4886 of the Revised Statutes, 35 USCA § 31.”); 
Pamela Samuelson, The Strange Odyssey of Software Interfaces and Intellectual Property Law, 
UC Berkeley Recent Work, 5 (Dec. 12, 2008), http://bit.do/StrangeOdyssey (“Odyssey Patent 
law had long excluded ‘printed matter,’ such as texts, from the scope of its protection, even 
though printed matter is a manufactured artifact, and hence literally within the meaning of the 
term ‘manufacture,’ one of the four categories of inventions for which patents may issue.”); 
Burk, Patenting Speech, supra note 41, at 141. (“U.S. courts have long held that mere 
arrangement of lines or symbols does not constitute patentable subject matter as such markings 
would not be within patentable subject matter as a new and useful machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter.”). 
 205. The fact that within an article function and the expression of function never meet is 
different than the fact two works can have similarity of function and expression. When 
addressing similarity of function and express the two exist on a continuum. Specifically, two 
works can share an identity of function but express that function differently. They can also share 
similarity of function and have various degrees of similarity of how they each express the 
function.  
 206. Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1879) (“A copyright gives the author or the 
publisher the exclusive right of multiplying copies of what he has written or printed. It follows 
that to infringe this right a substantial copy of the whole or of a material part must be 
produced.”). 
 207. Cf. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 531 (1853) (“The copperplate engraving [of a 
map], like any other tangible personal property, is the subject of seizure and sale, on execution, 
and the title passes to the purchaser, the same as if made at a private sale. But the incorporeal 
right, secured by the statute to the author, to multiply copies of the map, by the use of the plate, 
being intangible, and resting altogether in grant, is not the subject of seizure or sale by means of 
this process — certainly not at common law.”). 
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author of the second work had no ability to copy the original work. 
Both would be entitled to a copyright because both would be original 
within the meaning of copyright—they were both independently 
created.208 
Thus to plead and prove copyright infringement the copyright 
holder must prove first that the alleged infringer had access to the 
protected elements of the work and that protected elements were 
copied. Obviously, one cannot copy what one cannot see. Unlike 
almost any other literary work protected by copyright, proof that a 
defendant possessed a computer program is not proof that such person 
has access to the “set of statements or instruction to be used directly 
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result” as 
the protection of a computer program as a literary work is defined.209 
Without question the complete copying of an executable program that 
will allow the protected program to run on another computer 
necessary copies not only the functions of the program but its 
expression—its original statement or instructions—that cause the 
function. 210 The bundle of rights afforded to an author’s original 
expression of a creative idea by copyright, however, are not limited to 
verbatim copying of an entire work.211  
As we discussed above, programs coded in a language that 
requires compiling to function on a particular computer—such as a 
program coded in C++ as opposed to a program coded in an 
interpreted language like JAVA—translates these instructions into 
object and assembly code. As discussed above, there is no one-to-one 
																																								 																				
 208. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954) (“[T]wo men, each a perfectionist, 
independently making maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical, each may 
obtain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe 
the other’s copyright.”); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345 (1991) (“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 
F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Originality is, however, distinguished from novelty; there must 
be independent creation, but it need not be invention in the sense of striking uniqueness, 
ingeniousness, or novelty, since the Constitution differentiates ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ 
from ‘inventors’ and their ‘discoveries’.”). 
 209. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). 
 210. Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488, 508 (1892) (“The rule is well settled, that, 
although the entire copyrighted work be not copied in an infringement, but only portions 
thereof, if such portions are so intermingled with the rest of the piratical work that they cannot 
well be distinguished from it, the entire profits realized by the defendants will be given to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 211. Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518-519 (2002) (recognizing that 
pictures of Beanie Babies were a derivative work and that a catalogue that included such 
pictures needs to be evaluated based on the infringement of the derivative work rather than 
against the dolls themselves).  
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correlation between a line of assembly or object code with the 
generating source code and the same object or assemble code can be 
generated from source code instruction coded in the same or different 
programming languages. While the assembly code and object code of 
the compiled program are accessible and can be copied, if one is 
copying something less than the entire program it is extremely 
difficult to know precisely what one is copying. This is Dr. Seale’s 
thought experiment discussed above, the assembly and object code 
have “meaning” to a computer solely due to their syntactical 
structure—i.e. the computer acts based on the structure of the 
commands received not based on any actual understanding of what 
the structure means. In most instances, however, the grammar of 
assembly and object code do not impart any meaning to us. It is not 
that assembly and object code are devoid of semantics, but that the 
semantics are hidden by symbols that we do not readily understand. 
No different than if someone handed to us a book in Chinese when we 
do not speak the language or a musical score when we do not read 
music. No one would contend that the book or the score are devoid of 
expression. Instead, we simply do not understand the expression. We 
do not have access to it. 
An apt example is Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America 
Inc.212 In Nintendo, Atari wanted to sell games that worked with 
Nintendo game system, but did not want to pay Nintendo a license fee 
required to make its games compatible. Atari was able to isolate the 
object code within the game system that controlled the locking 
system, but was unable to design a key simply from the object code. It 
was only when Atari wrongfully obtained the source code for the 
Nintendo system from the Copyright Office that Atari was able to 
correct the errors in its code and gain compatibility of its games to the 
system.213 The Federal Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court 
grant of a preliminary injunction in Nintendo’s favor, affirming that 
Nintendo’s compatibility code was protectable as expression, and that 
Atari did not have a fair use defense because it did not lawfully 
possesses a copy of Nintendo’s accessible expression—the source 
code from which it created compatibility.214  
																																								 																				
 212. Atari, 975 F.2d at 835. 
 213. Id. at 836 (“After obtaining the 10NES source code from the Copyright Office, Atari 
again tried to read the object code from peeled chips. Through microscopic examination, Atari’s 
analysts transcribed the 10NES object code into a handwritten representation of zeros and ones. 
Atari used the information from the Copyright Office to correct errors in this transcription.”). 
 214. Id. at 844 (“To invoke the fair use exception, an individual must possess an 
authorized copy of a literary work . . . Because Atari was not in authorized possession of the 
Copyright Office copy of 10NES, any copying or derivative copying of 10NES source code 
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Curiously, despite the fact that Nintendo is a fairly early case in 
the jurisprudence of copyright protection of software, neither courts 
nor commentators have picked up on this issue of access as it relates 
to computer programs. Instead, both seem to simply gloss over the 
issue. The impact of this blind spot is probably best seen in 
commentators’ challenge that the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in 
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc.215 In particular, this impact 
relates to the argument that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Oracle 
cannot be reconciled with the First Circuit’s earlier decision in Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland Intern. Inc.  
In Oracle, Google admitted to copying portions of the 
application programming interface, or API, of the software 
development kit, or SDK, Oracle distributed to assist in writing code 
in the JAVA programming language.216 Google had access to and 
copied source code. APIs allow programmers to use short phrases—
declaring code—to call routine programming commands to help 
expedite the programming process. Google admittedly copied the 
command language known to anyone who programs in JAVA, but 
changed the underlying instruction called so that what was 
programmed would be uniquely functional in its android platform. 
This allowed programmers experienced with JAVA to easily code in 
android, but would result in a program compatible only with android. 
The District Court concluded that what Google copied was simply 
functional structure of the JAVA SDK and that its system and method 
of operation was not protectable under copyright law, citing Lotus.217 
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that “while the defendant in 
Lotus did not copy any of the underlying code, Google concedes that 
it copied portions of Oracles declaring source code verbatim.”218 
While much more can be said about Oracle, let’s stop and focus on 
this point of distinction. 
Commentators challenge that the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Oracle that copyright protection of a computer program can extend to 
the structure of its source code—including structures that easy 
programming in a coding language—runs contrary to precedent, and 
in particular the First Circuit’s well-respected Lotus decision.219 In 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
from the Copyright Office does not qualify as a fair use.”). 
 215. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1370. 
 
 216. Id. at 1376. 
 217. Id. at 1364. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Gordon, supra note 34, at 2. (“Debates over the conflict between Oracle and Lotus 
have largely ignored a middle road that supports the Lotus result without the potential for 
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Lotus, Borland intentionally mimicked the menu command hierarchy 
displayed to users of Lotus’ spreadsheet program so that users could 
easily transition to Borland’s competing Quatro Pro spreadsheet 
program.220 Significantly, “[i]n so doing, Borland did not copy any of 
Lotus’s underlying computer code.”221 The First Circuit reversed the 
district court’s grant of a permanent injunction, “hold[ing] that the 
Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable ‘method of 
operation;” i.e. function rather than expression.222 As an unprotected 
function, “[t]he fact that Lotus developers could have designed the 
Lotus menu command hierarchy differently is immaterial . . . .”223 
Based on our discussion, the distinction between Oracle and 
Lotus could not be more apparent. Borland never had access to the 
Lotus source code that achieved the functions observed in the 
functioning of the Lotus spreadsheet. What was copied was a function 
without knowledge of the instruction that achieved that function. By 
contrast, Google has access to the JAVA SDK source code and 
copied the source code to achieve the requisite functionality. 
Specifically, Google was found to have sufficiently copied the 
instruction to achieve the function. Lotus is simply not a case about 
copyright protection of a computer program within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act, which focuses on the “set of statements or instructions 
to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about 
a certain result.”224 Instead Lotus is better categorized as a case 
concerned with the protection of “audiovisual works,” which are 
works that consist of a series of related images . . . intended to be 
shown by the use of machines.”225 There should be no dispute that the 
copying of observed function with no access to the expression used to 
instruct the computer to achieve that function is not copying relevant 
to the Copyright Act. Even if by some chance of fate, the code 
Borland used to mimic Lotus’ functionality turned out to be identical, 
there still would be no copyright infringement of the computer 
program because Borland did not have access to the source code. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
overkill some observers see in Lotus. This middle road is a doctrine known as the 
‘explanation/use’ distinction. Laid out in the classic Supreme Court case of Baker v. Selden 
(1800), and ratified by statutory provisions of the Copyright Act including the much-ignored 
Section 113(b), the ‘explanation/use distinction.’”). 
 220. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810 (“Borland included in its Quattro and Quattro Pro version 1.0 
programs ‘a virtually identical copy of the entire 1-2-3 menu tree.’” (quoting Lotus Dev., Inc. v. 
Borland Int’l Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212 (D.Mass. 1983))).  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 815. 
 223. Id. at 816. 
 224. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 225. Id. 
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While the manner in which information is presented to a user can be 
protected by copyright—as is the case with computer games226—the 
First Circuit decision that the manner in which Lotus presented its 
menus to user for use of its spreadsheet program says nothing about 
whether copyright protects how an author structures a program to 
achieve functionality.227 
The lack of access to a program’s source code, however, is not in 
and of itself determinative on whether an alleged infringer has access 
to the literary work that is a computer program protectable by the 
Copyright Act. While meaning as opposed to the syntax of assembly 
and object code may be hidden, that does not mean assembly and 
object code themselves are simply functional and devoid of semantics 
as some commentators have argued.228 The fact that an infringer many 
not know the expression they are taking and may care only about the 
function expressed rather than how it is expressed—as in the case of 
copying an entire executable file—does not change the fact both the 
function and how the function has been expressed has been copied. 
But in deciding whether the protected “instructions to be used . . . in a 
computer . . . to bring about a certain result” have been infringed, as 
opposed to simply the visual presentation of the program itself, the 
courts should consider the extent to which the accused infringer had 
access to the protected instructions.  
																																								 																				
 226. Tetris Holding, LLC v. Xio Interactive, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 394, 410 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(“While there might not have actually been ‘literal copying’ inasmuch as Xio did not copy the 
source code and exact images from Tetris, Xio does not dispute that it copied almost all of 
visual look of Tetris. This leaves one to wonder what Xio believed was protectable expression. 
After the purportedly careful analysis it undertook to understand copyright law, apparently Xio 
believed it could engage in wholesale copying of the Tetris look and relate almost every visual 
element to a ‘rule,’ finding none of Tetris’s visual expression copyrightable.”). 
 227. Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 8, 681 (“What a program displays is not at 
all the same thing as the instructions which cause the display to occur. That is, it is not the 
program instructions that are displayed on the screen when a program is being executed. In 
general, one cannot get the program instructions to be -displayed on the screen even if one 
wants to. Of course, for the most part, the computer user does not want to know what the 
program instructions ‘say’ to the computer. The user does not care how the program does what 
it does, just that it does what it is supposed to do.”). 
 228. See id. (“There are several responses to this contention. First, while source code is 
clearly a literary work within the meaning of the statute, machine code is not. To say that a 
machine-readable program is a literary work because it is a ‘copy’ of a literary work, namely the 
source code, is like saying that a building is a drawing because the architectural plans which 
were used to make it are drawings. It is only if we do not understand what programs are that we 
can consider a machine code a literary work. A second response is that of John Hersey: ‘To call 
a machine-control element a copy of a literary work flies in the face of common sense.’” 
(quoting Dissent of Commissioner Hersey, Final Report of the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 21 (1978) republished in 3 COMPUT. L.J. 51 (1981)). 
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As discussed above, simply observing the visual functionality of 
a computer program in operation at best disclose the algorithm that 
preceded the architectural and functional specifications used to code 
what would become a computer program. Such algorithms are akin to 
“what is being taught” and is distinct from the structural and 
explanatory documents from which source code is created. Thus 
observing the visual display of a program’s function is at least a step 
removed both the syntax and semantics that state to the programming 
community the function to be performed (semantics) and instruct the 
computer the function to be performed (syntax).  
The fact that the semantics of object code are hidden and not 
removed is demonstrated in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega 
Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.229 In Sega, like Nintendo, a game 
manufacturer wanted their game to be accessible to a game platform 
without paying for access to the platform.230 Rather than 
surreptitiously obtaining the game systems source code, Accolade 
disassembled the object code from the system and loaded it onto a 
computer to identify the sequence of instructions necessary for 
compatibility.231 As the name suggest, disassembly refers to a method 
of attempting to divine source code from object code. When Accolade 
succeeded and began releasing unlicensed game for Sega system, 
Sega sued and obtained a preliminary injunction, which the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.232 The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that copying 
object code for purposes of identifying its functionality was not 
actionable copying within the meaning of the Copyright Act.233 The 
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that copyright protection reached the specific 
instructions to a computer in object code. “Although some scholarly 
authority supports that view, we have previously rejected it based on 
the language and legislative history.”234 The Ninth Circuit was not 
persuaded that object code that controlled interoperability was purely 
functional and beyond the reach of the Copyright Act.235 The Ninth 
Circuit, however, agreed with Accolade that Accolade’s copying to 
learn how to achieve interoperability although infringing was a fair 
use. “We conclude that where the disassembly is the only way to gain 
access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a computer 
program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such 
																																								 																				
 229. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 230. Id. at 1514. 
 231. Id. at 1515. 
 232. Id. at 1515-16. 
 233. Id. at 1518-19. 
 234. Id. at 1519. 
 235. Sega Enters, 977 F.2d at 1519. 
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access, disassembly is a fair use of a copyrighted work as a matter of 
law.”236 As will be developed below, however, copying for purposes 
of understanding function as held in Sega is distinct from copying in 
order to achieve interoperability.237 
E. While Substantial Similarity Is a Surrogate for Copying, 
Substantiality Should Not Be a Requirement for 
Infringement 
Once access is possible, copying is possible. For our purposes 
there are two issues: What was copied, and what is the proof that it 
was copied? Let’s address an issue with respect to the latter question 
first to resolve some confusion. Rarely, is there ever evidence of 
direct copying.. For this reason, courts allow juries to presume 
copying relevant to trigger infringement from evidence that the 
defendant had access to the work and that the challenged work bears a 
“substantial similarity” to the protected work in a meaningful 
manner.238 Courts typically speak of proof of access and copying as 
being on a sliding scale meaning the more compelling the evidence of 
similarity the less proof of access is necessary.239 This presumption of 
copying created by proof of access and substantial similarity can be 
rebutted by the defendant by proof of independent creation. Unlike in 
patent law, a shared identity between two works alone, even if 
indistinguishable, does not require a finding of infringement.240 
																																								 																				
 236. Id. at 1526. 
 237. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1370 (“We disagree with Google’s suggestion that Sony and Sega 
created an “interoperability exception” to copyrightability.”); Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1353 
(“Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently developed application 
programs written for the Apple II, but that is a commercial and competitive objective which 
does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions 
have merged.”). 
 238. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 
(7th Cir. 1982) (“Because direct evidence of copying often is unavailable, copying may be 
inferred where the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and the accused work is 
substantially similar to the copyrighted work.”); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 
558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Since direct evidence of copying is rarely, if ever, 
available, a plaintiff may prove copying by showing access and “substantial similarity” of the 
two works.”). 
 239. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[s]ubstantial 
similarity is inextricably linked to the issue of access. In what is known as the “inverse ratio 
rule,” we “require a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of 
access is shown.” (quoting Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 240. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Proof of copying is crucial to any 
claim of copyright infringement because no matter how similar the two works may be (even to 
the point of identity), if the defendant did not copy the accused work, there is no 
infringement.”). 
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While substantial similarity must be proven in the absence of 
direct evidence of copying, the question remains, “substantial as to 
what?” For example, if two four-hundred-page books share shocking 
similarity with respect to a single ten-page chapter, is that sufficient 
similarity to form the basis of a copyright claim? The confusion 
seems to stem from two distinct uses of the term “substantial” both of 
which are relevant to copyright law, but for different purposes. The 
substantiality part of the surrogate test for copying focuses on 
whether there is sufficient identity between the two works to allow a 
jury to presume that the defendant copied expression in the protected 
work sufficient to switch the burden to the defendant to prove that the 
work was independently created. The other use of substantial refers to 
whether the defendant copied a sufficient modicum of the protected 
expression to warrant action under the copyright law. In the absence 
of direct evidence of copying, the distinction between these two uses 
of substantial is blurred because the fewer elements a challenged 
work shares with the protected work, even if that identity is 
substantial, tends to tip against a finding that a presumption of 
copying is warranted.  
The importance of copyright law’s distinctive use of 
“substantial” becomes clear when there is direct evidence of copying. 
For example, what if a teenage character in my fantasy novel travels 
from New York to London in one chapter to have lunch with the film 
and literary character Harry Potter? While this encounter may only 
occupy five pages of my three-hundred-page book, even if it is 
necessary to my story that the reader understand that my character 
met with the Harry Potter, I would still need to admit to direct 
copying of the Harry Potter character. But could a court determine 
that my use of Ms. Rowling’s expression too insubstantial to allow 
her to prove infringement irrespective of the fair use defense?  
While the Copyright Act does not articulate any quantitative 
minimum threshold of actual copying necessary to support an 
infringement claim, some courts turn to the legal maxim “‘de minimus 
no curat lex’ (sometimes rendered, ‘the law does not concern itself 
with trifles”) [as] insulat[ing] from liability those who cause 
insignificant violations of the rights of other, so as to avoid the 
“perplexing task” of applying the fair use factors.241 In fact, some 
																																								 																				
 241. Ringgold v, Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). 
While Ringgold has been cited by several other cases as supporting a quantitative threshold for 
infringement, the Second Circuit in Ringgold noted the absence of case law in this area. Id. at 74 
(noting that the de minimus threshold was crossed and reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment based on fair use); Gordon v. Nextel Communications, 345 F.3d 922, 925 
(2003) (fleeting out of focus images of illustrations in commercial were de minimus). More 
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argue that the various substantial similarities tests employed by the 
differing jurisdictions not only considers substantiality for the 
purposes of determining whether copying of expression can be 
inferred, but necessarily consider substantiality for the purposes of 
determining whether a meaningful amount of expression has been 
copied.242 The Federal Circuit in Oracle avoided the issue of a free 
standing de minimis defense, finding what Google admitted to 
copying to be substantial.243 
Burdening the copyright holder with proving the substantiality of 
what was taken, however, makes little sense and has been roundly 
rejected by courts, at least in relation to music sampling.244 If reason 
does not support requiring a copyright holder to meet the multifaceted 
substantial similarity test where copying is conceded, then 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
curious is the Ninth Circuit’s use of de minimus in the Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 
(9th Cir. 2004). In Newton, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment that the 
copying of the composition copyright in a rap song was de minimus because it was nothing 
more than a “trite, and generic three-note sequence” and the average audience would not discern 
that Newton’s hand as a composer, apart from his talents as a performer, from the Beastie Boy 
use of the sample.” Id. (the Beastie Boys had a license to the sound recording from the record 
label). The Ninth Circuit’s qualitative evaluation of Newton’s contribution as a composer and its 
evaluation of whether listeners would discern his compositional contribution is unusual.  
 242. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement (Aug. 18, 
2010). Stan. Public Law Working Paper No. 1661434, http://bit.do/LemleyBizarreSystem (“For 
copying to rise to the level of infringement, it must include more than de minimis amount of 
copyrighted expression.”); Situation Management Systems, Inc. v. Asp. Consulting LLC, 560 
F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Our analysis, therefore, focuses entirely on whether the district 
court properly applied the second element of the Feist test. That prong ‘itself involves two steps: 
the plaintiff must show (a) that the defendant actually copied the work as a factual matter, ... and 
(b) that the defendant’s `copying of the copyrighted material was so extensive that it rendered 
the infringing and copyrighted works substantially similar.”’” (quoting T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. 
Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 108 (1st Cir. 2006)); Society of Holy Transfiguration v. 
Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012) (“A party seeking to establish copying of a work’s original 
elements must make a dichotomized showing. The copyright holder first must factually 
establish, whether via direct or circumstantial evidence, that the alleged infringer copied the 
protected work. Secondly, the holder must show that the copying was so flagrantly extreme that 
the allegedly infringing and copyrighted works were, for all intents and purposes, ‘substantially 
similar.’”) (citations omitted). 
 243. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1378 (“Oracle argues that the Ninth Circuit does not recognize a 
de minimis defense to copyright infringement and that, even if it does, we should affirm the 
judgments of infringement on grounds that Google’s copying was significant. Because we agree 
with Oracle on its second point, we need not address the first, except to note that there is some 
conflicting Ninth Circuit precedent on the question of whether there is a free-standing de 
minimis defense to copyright infringement or whether the substantiality of the alleged copying is 
best addressed as part of a fair use defense.”).  
 244. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimensions Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (2005) (“[E]ven 
when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part taken is something of value. No 
further proof of that is necessary than the fact that the producer of the record or the artist on the 
record intentionally sampled because it would (1) save costs, or (2) add something to the new 
recording, or (3) both.”). While some argue that sampled music should be treated differently 
than other forms of copyright infringement, there is no cogent reason for doing so. 
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substantiality should mean nothing more in a circumstantial case than 
sufficient identity in some protectable expression to allow a finding of 
copying to be inferred irrespective and not to support some 
quantitative threshold.  
Rather than imposing on the copyright holder the burden of 
showing that what was taken was substantial, better reasoned cases 
hold insubstantial copying, while still infringing, does not warrant 
injunctive relief and supports the affirmative defense of a fair use.245 
Even where the defendant is unable to make the case for a fair use of 
the protected expression, the public good is served by denying 
injunctive relief but awarding damages where the copying is 
insubstantial when compared with defendant’s original expression a 
as a whole.246 As will be discussed below, while the quantitative and 
qualitative use made of a protected expression is relevant to the 
affirmative defense of fair use, its application is not limited to 
quantitatively insubstantial use. 
F. A New Work That Is Less Than a Facsimile of the Work As a 
Whole Is a Derivate Work 
It stands to reason that proof of any copying of an original 
expression of a creative idea, whether by direct evidence or by proof 
of access and substantial similarity, is infringing. Are all infringing 
works necessarily derivative works? The most common conceptions 
of a derivative works are collections of several works—i.e. 
collections of poems or short stories—or transfers of a work to a 
different medium –i.e. books to movies, movies to plays, animation to 
merchandise. Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act, however, simply 
defines a derivative work as “a work based upon one or more pre-
existing works.” That a derivative work includes “any . . . form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed or adopted,” indicates a 
legislative intent that a derivative work must include some modicum 
of original expression of a creative idea, distinguishing a derivative 
work from a mere copy.247 Key again is a creativity. An artist who 
																																								 																				
 245. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 917 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(overturning equitable relief extending all generations of Bratz dolls); Sandovol v. New Line 
Cinema Corp., 973 F.Supp. 409, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 246. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 513, 526 (1999). Judge Kozinski argues for dispensing with 
both the fair use defense and injunctive relief in most cases involving a derivative work in favor 
of a scheme whereby the copyright holder recovers “compensation for the value arising from 
their work, but the derivative users are allowed to profit from the value they add.” Id. His 
proposal still included a remnant of a fair use defense excluding from recovery “those damages 
attributable to critical evaluation of the copyright work.” Id. 
 247. 17 U.S.C. section 103(a) (1976); Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 302 
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painstakingly transforms a work to a different media with the intent of 
creating a perfect facsimile—creating a perfect digital rendering of an 
automobile for example—may not be a derivative work within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act if his laborious effort lacks the creative 
necessary for copyright protection.248 Thus, a new work is a 
derivative work only if its use of a pre-existing work would be 
sufficient to make a prima facie case for infringement, ignoring for 
this purpose the author’s right to use the prior work based on consent, 
a fair use or because the work is in the public domain.249 Therefore, 
other than pure facsimiles, all other infringing works are derivative 
works within the meaning of the Copyright Act.  
This conclusion is important. While the author of a derivative 
work arguably has established some level of new expression of a 
creative idea,250 the right to make and control derivative works is one 
of the bundle of rights held by a copyright owner. If the owner of an 
indefensibly infringing work is afforded copyright protection for 
those portions of the infringing work that are his own original 
expressions of a creative idea, the right of the infringed copyright 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
(7th Cir. 1983) (“As with any painting there was an admixture of the painter’s creativity — how 
much, we shall consider later — but that it is a painting of Judy Garland as she appears in 
photographs from the movie (such as the photograph reproduced at the end of this opinion as 
Figure 2), and is therefore a derivative work, is beyond question.”); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee 
Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1982) (“A work which makes non-trivial 
contributions to an existing one may be copyrighted as a derivative work and yet, because it 
retains the “same aesthetic appeal” as the original work, render the holder liable for 
infringement of the original copyright if the derivative work were to be published without 
permission from the owner of the original copyright.”).  
 248. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1268 (10th Cir. 
2008). In affirming the district court grant of summary judgment that computer assisted 3D 
models of a Toyota car were not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection, the Tenth 
Circuit recognized that “[i]f an artist affirmatively sets out to be unoriginal—to make a copy of 
someone else’s creation, rather than to create an original work—it is far more likely that the 
resultant product will, in fact, be unoriginal.” Id. citing RussVerSteeg, Intent, Originality, 
Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L.REV. 123, 133 (2002); ATC Distr. Group, Inc. v. 
Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The 
illustrations were intended to be as accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the 
photographs on which they were based, a form of slavish copying that is antithesis of 
originality.”). 
 249. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We have stated that 
‘[a] work will be considered a derivative work only if it would be considered an infringing work 
if the material which it has derived from a prior work had been taken without the consent of a 
copyright proprietor of such prior work.’”) (quoting United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 n. 
2 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 250. While courts typically do not involve themselves in gauging the originality of a work 
seeking copyright protection, “a derivative work must be substantially different from the 
underlying work to be copyrightable.” Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (not sufficient originality in authorized painting of Dorothy from the Wizard of Oz to 
support its independent copyright ability). 
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holder to make and control derivative works held by the infringed 
copyright holder is compromised to some extent. Some commentators 
argue that the creators of the infringing derivative work can still 
maintain an infringement claim against a third party for infringement 
of their original expression so long as pre-existing work does not 
pervade the derivative work.251 The House Report accompanying the 
1976 Copyright Act does indicate that the creator of a derivative work 
must possess the consent of the underlying copyright holder in order 
to obtain protection for those portions of the work that do not employ 
the prior work. That report adds, however, that “a copyright could be 
obtained as long as the use of the preexisting work was not 
unlawful.”252 Where the use of the protected elements of a pre-
existing work was unlawful—i.e. done without consent and absent a 
fair use defense—courts have ruled that no valid copyright existed in 
any portion of a derivative work.253 While some debate remains as to 
the ability of the creator of a derivative work to enforce against third 
parties his unique original expression of creative ideas not intertwined 
with the unauthorized pre-existing work, the better course, as 
discussed below, might be to require the creator to demonstrate that 
his unauthorized use of the work in the context of the derivative work 
as a whole was fair and thus not unlawful. Moreover, even if the 
author of the derivative work is unable to prove his use of a pre-
existing work was fair, rather than permit him to copyright the 
derivative work as a whole, the better course is to allow an author to 
protect his new expression of a creative idea to the extent he can 
excise his expression from the underlying work.254 For example, the 
																																								 																				
 251. Nimmer § 3.06 at 3-34.31 (citing cases citing treatise). 
 252. The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, at p. 57-58, reprinted in Nimmer at 
App. 4-23.  
 253. Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 405-06 (7th Cir. 2000), (“Concentrating the right to 
make derivative works in the owner of the original work prevents what might otherwise be an 
endless series of infringement suits posing insoluble difficulties of proof.”); Schrock v. Learning 
Curve Int’l, 531 F.Supp. 2d 990, 996 (N.D. Ill 2008) (“Because Section 106(2) grant a copyright 
owner the exclusive right to prepare (or to authorize) derivative works as part of its burden of 
rights, a third party seeking to copyright a derivative work must have the permission of the 
copyright holder of the underlying work.”). 
 254. Judge Posner in Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) 
appears to take a different tact when discussing the derivative nature of the Beanie Babies 
Collector’s Guide, which included photographs of copyrighted Beanie Babies. While 
recognizing that the photographs of the Beanie Babies in the guide were derivate works, Judge 
Posner concludes that the text is not a derivative work. Id. Curiously, Judge Posner seems to 
believe that single work can have both derivative and non-derivative components. Judge Posner 
concludes that the copyright holder’s provable damages should be limited to the profits from the 
photographs (i.e. the portion of the guide that is derivative) and not the profits from the work as 
a whole. Id. at 524. While an apportionment of profits for an infringing derivative work makes 
some sense, the mental gymnastics required to conclude that a single work can be both 
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author of a catalogue of works by a famous visual artist could obtain a 
copyright on his commentary about the artists, which can easily be 
separated from the images, but probably could not obtain a copyright 
on his photographs of the artist’s work.  
G. A Work Derived from Another’s Expression Transforms the 
Original, So All Transformative Works Are Derivate Works  
It is interesting that Section 103 qualifies new works that meet 
the definition of a derivative work as those that “recast, transform[] or 
adapt[]” one or more pre-existing works in order to distinguish them 
from simple facsimiles.255 Since, with the exception of facsimiles, all 
infringing works are derivative work, are all works that transform the 
original expressed creative ideas of a pre-existing work prima facie 
infringing? Logic dictates that the answer to that question is yes. 
Assuming that use of the underlying work is sufficient to meet the 
requirements of a derivative work, then such transformation of the 
pre-existing work is infringing and unlawful absent consent or some 
other basis for a lawful use. Thus, the mere fact that a new work is 
transformative does not mean that the transformative work is not 
infringing. Obviously, not all transformative works are derivative 
works. For example, the story of an otherwise unassuming man who 
hides his identity as a crime fighter with super human capabilities is 
an idea that has been expressed as Superman, Spiderman and the 
Green Hornet and can be transformed into limitless other characters 
that are not derivative within the meaning of the Copyright Act so 
long as such characters do not impinge on the original expression of 
known superhero.256 This same notion underscores the issue in cases 
involving computer software, whether what was taken was creative 
expression or simply a process, function or structure. This returns to 
the basic premise that copyright protects how you teach, but not what 
you teach.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
derivative and not derivative seems unnecessary.  
 255. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has noted that Copyright Act’s definition of a 
derivative work is “hopelessly overbroad . . . for ‘[e]very book in literature, science and art 
borrows and uses much which was well known and used before.” Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 
154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1845)).  
 256. In fact, the owners of Superman claimed copyright infringement against the network 
television series “The Greatest American Hero,” in which a high school teacher gains 
superpowers to fight evil when he receives a costume from space aliens. Warner Bros, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 243 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The overall 
perception of the way Hinkley looks and acts marks him as a different non-infringing character 
who simply has some of the superhuman traits popularized by the Supreman character and now 
widely shared within the superhero genre.”).  
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Some courts take a different tack, arguing that a second author 
can so transform an original expression that it ceases to be a 
derivative work because the expression in the new work ceases to be 
substantially similar to the original work.257 This logic seems to 
jumble distinct concepts. To the extent that a second author copies the 
protectable expression of the original author, a prima facie case of 
infringement has been made. As discussed above, the substantial 
similarity factor, when combined with evidence of access, serves as 
circumstantial evidence of copying. If the second author’s original 
expression of a creative idea is so different that it is not substantially 
similar to an underlying expression in any material respect, it cannot 
be said that the second author copied any original expression of the 
underlying author. Rather than there being a continuum whereby a 
work derived from a protectable expression can be so transformed 
that it ceased to be a copy, it is better to attach transformation to a 
continuum running from how something is taught to what is taught or 
from the expression of an idea, function or process and the idea, 
function or process itself. As similarities between expressions diverge 
what is being transformed moves from a protectable expression 
towards an unprotected idea, function or process. To the extent that 
the original author proves a copying of his expression, the burden 
shifts to the second author to prove his use fair. There is no 
independent defense that the original author failed to make a prima 
facie case of infringement because the second author so transformed 
the protected expression that it ceased to be substantially similar.  
This idea of a continuum comes from Learned Hand in a quote 
referenced above and more fully stated here.  
Upon any work … a great number of patterns of increasing generality will 
fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may 
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is 
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in 
this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, 
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.258  
Simply, at some level of abstraction, all works share an identity, 
as one enterprising lawyer demonstrated by outlining the similarities 
in plot, sequence and events between “The Wizard of Oz” and “Star 
																																								 																				
 257. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l Corp., 354 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“Because the allegedly derivative work . . . sufficiently transformed the expression of the 
original work . . . such that the two works ceased to be substantially similar, ‘the secondary 
work is not a derivative work and, for that matter, does not infringe the copyright of the original 
work.’”). 
 258. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).  
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Wars.”259 This notion of a continuum between the idea and its 
expression well recognized in works of pure aesthetics should be 
carried over to computer software so that court recognize a continuum 
between the structure, process and function performed by the program 
and the expression that achieves that particular structure, process or 
function. 
The issue confronted by Judge Hand in Nichols was not one of 
copyrightability but of whether the identity between the two works 
went beyond an identity of ideas on a continuum to reach an identity 
of how the idea were expressed.260 For our purposes, the similarity 
continuum would be between unprotected function, process, or 
structure and how the function, process, or structure is expressed. As 
above, we must be precise again here. The relevant similarity of 
function, process and structure for purposes for the protection of a 
computer program as defined by the Copyright Act is from the 
prospective of the author of the program—the structure, function or 
process of the code itself—and not structure, function or process 
experienced by the user of the program. Again the distinction between 
Lotus and Oracle. 
Judge Hand’s comment about the difficult task courts face in 
determining when a protected expression ends and an unprotected 
idea begins applies when the alleged infringing work has not simply 
copied or plagiarized text, but allegedly has copied themes, plot or 
structure of a creative work.261 This notion that copyright protects 
more than simply the copying of text is clear from suggestion that 
courts not be swayed by the differences between two works262 or 
focus too much on isolated similarities263 but should compare the 
																																								 																				
 259. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 260. Patry, supra note 191, at 212 (“The issue in Nichols was not copyrightability, but 
rather infringement where the defendant did not copy the text, but allegedly, characters and 
plot—integral parts of a unified whole.”); Mark A. Lemley, Convergence in the Law of Software 
Copyright?, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1995) (“Copying violative of the statute includes not only 
the literal taking of the words or expression of another, but also what is called “non-literal 
infringement” -the taking of the essence of the author’s expression without using the author’s 
actual words. Were copyright protection limited to literal infringement, as Judge Hand has 
noted, a plagiarist could ‘escape by immaterial variations.’”).  
 261. Lemley, supra note 260. 
 262. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.) 
(“no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”). 
 263. Comparison lists of literal similarities “between the two works are “inherently 
subjective and unreliable,” particularly where the list contains random similarities, and many 
such similarities could be found in very dissimilar works.” Herzog v. Castle Rock 
Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 20 F.3d 454 460 (11th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 599 (2d Cir 1996) 
(“[S]uch lists are ‘inherently subjective and unreliable,” particularly where “the list emphasizes 
random similarities scattered throughout the works.’) (quoting” Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 
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“total concept and feel” of the two works.264 This non-literal 
comparison of the two works is referred to in some jurisdictions for 
works of aesthetics as the “extrinsic and “intrinsic” test for substantial 
similarity. “The ‘extrinsic test’ is an objective comparison of specific 
expressive elements. ‘[T]he test focuses on articulable similarities 
between [all objective manifestations of expression, including] the 
plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence 
of events in two works.’”265 “The ‘intrinsic test’ is a subjective 
comparison that focuses on “whether the ordinary, reasonable 
audience” would find the works substantially similar in the ‘total 
concept and feel of the works.’”266 Commentators and courts have 
questioned whether the copyright protection of computer programs 
should similarly reach beyond copying of the source code itself and 
reach similar structural—or non-literal—elements of the code.267 
The Federal Circuit confronted this issue in Oracle. The court 
first acknowledged a confusing use of “literal,” noting “[t]he 
distinction between literal and non-literal aspects of a computer 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 264. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding infringement 
on the basis of protectable and similar combinations of letters, colors and patterns in two 
alphabet rugs — in sum, on the basis of the “enormous amount of sameness” between the two 
designs). 
 265. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf v. 
Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted) (“the extrinsic test, now encompassing all objective manifestations of 
expression, no longer fits that description.”); Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 
2015) (“The ‘extrinsic inquiry is an objective one,’ looking to specific and ‘external criteria’ of 
substantial similarity between the original elements (and only the original elements) of a 
protected work and an alleged copy.” (quoting Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 
732-33 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 266. Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Kouf, 16 
F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 
101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The fact-finder must examine the works for their total concept and 
feel.”).  
 267. Comput. Associates, 982 F.2d at 712 (“[It] may well be that the Copyright Act serves 
as a relatively weak barrier against public access to the theoretical interstices behind a 
program’s source and object codes.”); Jonathan Ambrose, Oracle America Inc. v. Google, Inc: 
The Only Nonliteral Aspect of JAVA API’s Protected Under copyright law are the Ones Nobody 
Wants to Copy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 13-14 (2012) (“In reality, novels enjoy a much 
greater scope of copyright protection for these nonliteral story elements. The comparison 
between these two works, one artistic and one functional, illustrates the apparent absurdity of 
applying copyright protection to computer programs”); Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection 
of Computer Documents, Reverse Engineering, and Professor Miller, 193 UNIV. OF DAYTON L. 
REV. 975, 987 (1994) (“No court, however, has quite come to grips with the fundamental 
question of why any nonliteral program aspect that somehow survives the filtering procedure 
can be deemed “expressive.” Every aspect of a program, literal and nonliteral, is intended by its 
author to serve the functional purpose of causing the program to perform in some optimal 
manner in relation to the constraints set by the environment in which it is to be used (including 
the nature of its intended or expected users).”). 
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program [a]s separate from the distinction between literal and non-
literal copying. ‘Literal’ copying is verbatim copying of original 
expression. ‘Nonliteral’ copying is ‘paraphrased or loosely 
paraphrased rather than word for word.’”268 Google conceded it 
“literally copied the declaring code verbatim,” which Oracle 
analogized to copying “‘the chapter titles and topic sentences 
represent the structure of a novel.’”269 By copying the declaring code 
and using it to trigger new implementing code that Google wrote, 
Oracle argued that Google infringed protected non-literal elements of 
its JAVA SDK because “when Google copied the declaring code in 
these packages ‘it also copied the “sequence and organization” of the 
packages (i.e., the three-dimensional structure with all the chutes and 
ladders)’” employed by the packages.270 Significantly, even the 
district court, the decision of which the Federal Circuit reversed, 
recognized that structure, sequence, and organization (“SSO”) of the 
JAVA API packages were creative and original.271 The district court 
held, however, that the SSO was a “‘method of operation’ the 
‘[d]uplication of [which was] necessary for interoperability.’”272 
Thus, there was no dispute between either the district court or the 
Federal Circuit that the infringement analysis for a computer program 
is akin to that applied by courts for aesthetic works and considers 
both the text itself—literal infringement—as well as the program’s 
structure, sequence and organization—its non-literal elements. In this 
case, the district court and the Federal Circuit disagreed as to whether 
the portion of the SSO copied was copyrightable.  
In this respect, the Oracle opinion is consistent with the practice 
of programming, which recognizes that what is creative about a 
program is more than simply the source code itself. As discussed 
above, among practitioners the most creative component of 
programming is the design of the architecture and functional 
specifications to implement an algorithm, believing that when 
properly designed the actual coding of the structure, functions and 
processes expressed in the design documents should be relatively 
straightforward. These design documents are the creative expression 
of the intended algorithm. In this way, coding from design documents 
should be almost like translating an existing text, which creative in its 
own respect, but does not take away from the creativity in the source 
																																								 																				
 268. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356 (Fed. (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 
807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 269. Id. (quoting Appellant Br. 27).  
 270. Id. (quoting Appellant Br. 45). 
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. (quoting 872 F.Supp.2d at 977.). 
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document.273 Similarly, the design documents could be seen as a 
script, a play or a score, directing the action to be taken. Limiting 
copyright protection to the literal text, which ignoring the structure, 
process and function as expressed in the design document makes no 
sense. Any test of substantial similarity of computer programs should 
be akin to how copyright determines substantial similarity in other 
literary works or motion pictures, which is concerned with evaluating 
the work as a whole—including it overall mood, setting, pace, 
characters, and sequence of events—and not simply isolated 
identities.  
Rather than deciding that a computer program’s SSO is not 
creative within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the district court in 
Oracle ruled the SSO of JAVA’s SDK limited Google’s ability to 
utilize functionality of the JAVA programming language when it 
developed its SDK for android—i.e. the expression of the function 
had merged with the function itself.274 A conclusion that the Federal 
Circuit reversed. This aspect of the Federal Circuit decision has been 
highlighted by the decision’s critics.275 Where the district court 
focused on the options available to Google to utilize the efficiencies 
achieved by the JAVA SDK for programming in the JAVA 
programming language with its SDK for android, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that in determining whether there are creative alternatives 
sufficient to distinguish expression from the intended function must 
be judged from the prospective of the author of the copyright work 
and not from the perspective of who later wants to implement the 
functionality.276 
																																								 																				
 273. Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 
2012) (“The Copyright Act makes clear that translations may be original and copyrightable, 
despite being derivative of another product.”). 
 274. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1360 (The [district] court explained that, under the rules of Java, 
a programmer must use the identical “declaration or method header lines” to ‘declare a method 
specifying the same functionality.’ Because the district court found that there was only one way 
to write the declaring code for each of the Java packages, it concluded that ‘the merger doctrine 
bars anyone from claiming exclusive copyright ownership’ of it. Accordingly, the court held 
there could be ‘no copyright violation in using the identical declarations.’” (citations omitted)). 
 275. Samuelson, Functionality and Expression, supra note 50, at 44 (“Numerous cases 
have taken other factors into account when assessing merger defenses, such as whether the 
claimed expression was the most logical and useful way to do something, whether practical 
considerations or functionality limited options, and whether particular designs were necessary to 
achieving objectives.”). 
 276. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1361 (“We further find that the district court erred in focusing its 
merger analysis on the options available to Google at the time of copying. It is well-established 
that copyrightability and the scope of protectable activity are to be evaluated at the time of 
creation, not at the time of infringement.”) 
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Let’s quickly consider Google’s argument. In essence, because 
the tools included in JAVA SDK had gained widespread adoption by 
those who programmed in the JAVA programming language, how 
those tools were expressed in the JAVA SDK –i.e. the explicit 
commands used to call particular functionality—had lost any 
distinctive expression because, through use by programmers, they had 
become the most efficient way to call such commands. It is in this 
way commentators view Oracle as akin to Lotus. When Google 
decided to use the JAVA programming language as a basis for 
android—the JAVA programming language itself was not 
copyrighted277—Google was free, as it did, to build its own SDK to 
facility programmers to program in JAVA for android and to copy the 
function and structure of the JAVA SDK and the tools included in the 
program. Unlike in Lotus, however, where the function copied was its 
display to the end user of the program—Borland did not have access 
to the source code that implemented the displayed functionality—
Google copied the actual source code and its structure to implement 
the functionality in its SDK. The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
reasons why Google copied portions of the JAVA SDK’s SSO are not 
relevant the copyrightability of the SSO or whether its expression had 
merged with its function.278 Instead, the Federal Circuit concluded, as 
did the Ninth Circuit in Sega,279 that the reasons why expression was 
																																								 																				
 277. Samuelson, Functionality and Expression, supra note 50, at 45 (“[T]he CAFC 
ignored the District Court’s finding that there was far less of a distinction between the Java 
language and the API packages than Oracle acknowledged. Insofar as there is little or no 
difference between the Java language—which all agree is not protectable by copyright law—
and the component parts of the API that Google used, this consideration weighs in favor of 
finding merger in Oracle.” 
 278. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1371 (“[T]he focus is on the compatibility needs and 
programming choices of the party claiming copyright protection — not the choices the 
defendant made to achieve compatibility with the plaintiff’s program. Consistent with this 
approach, courts have recognized that, once the plaintiff creates a copyrightable work, a 
defendant’s desire ‘to achieve total compatibility... is a commercial and competitive objective 
which does not enter into the ... issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.’ 
(quoting Apple Comput., 714 F.2d at 1253.); compare Samuelson, Functionality and 
Expression, supra note 50, at 38. (“Given that programs are utilitarian works that courts often 
say should enjoy only a thin scope of copyright protection, it is curious that courts have not 
articulated and applied a function/expression merger doctrine, as such, in software infringement 
cases. The reluctance to do this may stem from the misleading nature of the literary work 
metaphor that so often pervades copyright discourse about computer programs. This metaphor 
obscures the deeply functional nature of programs which have a higher quantum of utilitarian 
elements as compared with conventional literary works such as novels and plays.”) 
 279. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (“the 
record clearly establishes that disassembly of the object code in Sega’s video game cartridges 
was necessary in order to understand the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility.”) 
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copied are relevant to whether its copying of the expression was 
fair,280 as the jury in Oracle ultimately held.  
Let’s return for a moment to the evaluation of whether the 
identity between computer programs relates to protectable expression 
or is simply an identity of unprotected functionality. This is the 
difficult task that Judge Hand referred to in a number of opinions 
concerning the determination of whereon a continuum the identity 
between two works ceases to be protectable expression of an idea, 
function, structure or process to be simply an identity between ideas, 
functions and structures that are being expressed differently. The 
analysis in Lotus type situation is fairly straightforward with respect 
to the protection of a computer program as a computer program 
because Borland never had access to how Lotus expressed the copied 
ideas, functions or processes. Irrespective of Judge Hand’s conclusion 
that “[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator 
has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and has borrowed its 
‘expression,’”281 courts, relying on Judge Hand’s lamentations, have 
adopted an abstraction/filtering test. 282 A test criticized by many 
noted jurists and commentators.283  
Rather than viewing “what is taught” as being on a continuum 
with “how it is taught,” consistent with Judge Hand’s suggestion, the 
abstraction/filter tests asks courts to first separate what is 
copyrightable in a computer program from what is not—separate 
“what is taught” from “how it is taught”—and then asks the jury to 
evaluate only the protectable portions for substantial similarity.”284  
																																								 																				
 280.  Id.  
 281. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960); 
Mark A. Lemley, Convergence In The Law Of Software Copyright?, 10 BERKELEY TECH. L.J 1, 
6 (1995) (Judge Learned Hand commented early and often on the arbitrariness of any such 
determination). 
 282. Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 839 (“Judge Learned Hand devised an abstraction 
test to separate the idea from expression in written or dramatic works.”)  
 283. Patry, supra note 191, at 201 (2003) (“Although Nimmer erroneously characterized 
Judge Hand’s discussion in Nichols as an “abstractions test,” and has successfully argued its 
adoption in a mutated form in computer program cases with disastrous consequences, as Judge 
Easterbrook wisely observed, the abstractions test is not a ‘test’ at all. It is a clever way to pose 
the difficulties that require courts to avoid either extreme of the continuum of generality.’ (Nash 
v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990)) Similarly, Judge Newman has written that 
‘Judge Hand manifestly did not think of his observations as the enunciation of anything that 
might be called a “test.” His disclaimer (for himself and everyone else) of the ability to “fix the 
boundary” should have been sufficient caution that no “test” capable of yielding a result was 
intended. (Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in 
the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 694 (1999))”.) 
 284. Burk, Patenting Speech, supra note 41, at 135 (“[T]he abstraction/filtration test, 
designed to winnow idea from expression, have been employed to separate function from 
expression. In this type of infringement analysis, courts first subtract from consideration 
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When this abstraction/filtration test is applied to software, “[t]he 
first step involves constructing a hierarchy of abstraction from the 
most abstract to the most detailed for the plaintiff’s program.”285 The 
second step involves filtering out from the analysis various elements 
of the program that are beyond the scope of copyright protection.”286 
This step will filter out “three kinds of unprotected elements: (1) 
elements of program design dictated by efficiency; (2) design choices 
constrained by external factors, such as the hardware and software 
with which the program was designed to operate, demands of the 
industry being served, and widely accepted programming practices; 
and (3) public domain elements of programs, such as commonplace 
programming techniques, ideas, and know-how.”287 “The third step 
involves comparing any remaining ‘golden nuggets’ of expression in 
the plaintiff’s program with the defendant’s program to determine if 
the defendant copied substantially amounts of expression from the 
plaintiffs’ program. 288 Not surprising, when “properly” applied, this 
test results in very thin protection for computer programs due to their 
inherent “functional” and “utilitarian.”289 While the 
abstraction/filtration test comes in many flavors, most asks the court 
to first engage in an “analytic dissection” to separate out protectable 
from unprotectable elements and then to compare only protectable 
elements.290 According to at least one court, “this process begins with 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
uncopyrightable elements of the works being evaluated, then they compare what remains to 
determine the degree of similarity between the expression contained in the works.”). 
 285. Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 59, at 1770 (2011) (described the test adopted 
the Federal Circuit in Nintendo and suggesting that it is the test “now widely adopted.”) 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Comput. Associates, 982 F.2d at 707 (“Once the program’s abstraction levels have 
been discovered, the substantial similarity inquiry moves from the conceptual to the concrete. 
Professor Nimmer suggests, and we endorse, a “successive filtering method” for separating 
protectable expression from non-protectable material; See generally 3 Nimmer § 13.03[F]. This 
process entails examining the structural components at each level of abstraction to determine 
whether their particular inclusion at that level was “idea” or was dictated by considerations of 
efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors external to the 
program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.”); 
compare Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 623, 641 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(“We suggest that a court will often be assisted in determining the factual issue of copying if 
both programs are first compared in their entirety without filtering out the unprotected elements. 
Such a preliminary step does not obviate the ultimate need to compare just the protected 
elements of the copyrighted program with the alleged infringing program. However, an initial 
holistic comparison may reveal a pattern of copying that is not obvious when only certain 
components are examined.”) 
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the code and ends with an articulation of the program’s ultimate 
function.”291  
This test asks courts to do first what Judge Hand determined was 
exceedingly difficult, divining at the outset where expression ends 
and ideas, processes, functions and structures begin. For this very 
reason, this test makes no sense. A much simpler approach would be 
to simply follow Judge Hand’s suggestion that “what is expressed” 
and “how it is expressed” exist on a continuum and where one begins 
and the other ends must be determined on a case by case bases and 
any algorithm to divine this demarcation would be arbitrary. Such an 
approach would start directly opposite from the present norm. Rather 
than starting with the code itself and working up, start at the highest 
level of abstraction to identify the similarities that exist between the 
accused and protected program—what are the similar ideas, function, 
structures and processes. Then as to each discovered similarity travel 
down the continuum to determine where the similarities end. If it ends 
before an identity of expression there is no infringement. If it passes 
the threshold, there is. 
As mentioned, this logical test starts with the easiest step first: 
identify the similarities between the copyrighted program and the 
alleged infringing program. Second, for each separately evaluate 
whether their identity is limited to each: (1) performing the same 
function or process; (2) having the same structure; (3) or expressing 
the same idea. Third, if the identity between each similar feature is 
more than each embody the same idea, function, structure or idea, 
evaluate whether each achieve the same function, process or structure 
the same way. Fourth, if each get to the same place in similar ways, 
you are now in the position to determine whether they each express 
their ideas, functions, structures or process in such a similarly manner 
as to violated the Copyright Act. Finally, if copying within the 
meaning of the Copyright Act is found the accused infringer has the 
right to argue that its use is fair because (1) there are only a limited 
number of ways to express what is taught; (2) copying of expression 
was needed to achieve necessary interoperability; or (3) the public 
good is otherwise better served by not enforcing the Copyright Act in 
this context. Below of a graphic of this analysis without the fair use 
overlay. 
																																								 																				
 291. Comput. Associates, 982 F.2d at 707. 
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H. The Problem of Fair Use. 
If we accept Judge Hand’s suggestion that the demarcation 
between expression and ideas are on a continuum, and if we also 
begin the fair use defense slightly before the difficult to discern 
point—where the expression ends and generalized idea, function, 
structure or process expressed begins—as was done in both Sega and 
Oracle, we avoid much of the controversy surrounding the protection 
of computer programs. Allowing for fair use justifications for 
copying—such as to achieve interoperability, to study function, to 
capitalize on familiarity, the lack of alternative ways to code, or to 
achieve a transformative use—seem more logical approach to 
evaluating a computer program than attempting to fit these 
justification into reasons why what was copied was not protected by 
copyright. With this notion the fair use overlay need not be limited to 
where “what is taught” intersects with “what is taught,” but can 
extend to verbatim copying if the justification for the copying 
demonstrates that the public good is better served by not enforcing the 
copyright law is a particular instance. 
The Federal Circuit correctly recognized that whether an article 
is creative and original—i.e. whether it is copyrightable—must be 
2017] SOFTWARE AS TEXT  397 
evaluated at the point of its creation. A work does not lose its 
copyright protection because of any limits its existence may place on 
second comers. Neither James Bond nor Harry Potter lose their 
copyright protections because they now so dominate the realm of the 
British spy or the young wizard. One could easily argue that due to 
their familiarity it is much more efficient for me to write a British spy 
novel or a fantasy about a boy wizard by simply using James Bond or 
Harry Potter because I do not need to concern myself with developing 
their back story. In the same way, neither Windows 10 nor JAVA’s 
SDK should lose any portion of their copyright protections simply 
because of their prevalence, preference, or familiarity among a 
desired audience. Instead, in this regard computer programs should be 
evaluated as any other work protected by copyright. Copyright law 
does not interfere with programmers’ rights to use the ideas, 
functions, structures and processes of protected programs to make 
new works. Absent a legitimate justification, they do not have the 
right, however, to plagiarize how the protected work expresses that 
idea, function, structure or process in their new work. Such a use 
would result in a derivative work, which is among the rights the 
copyright holder retains.  
The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.—the 
notorious case where 2 Live Crew sampled Roy Orbison’s Pretty 
Woman—held that a subsequent use of a copyrighted works 
expression can be fair if the new use is transformative of the 
underlying work.292 Some have suggested that this means that the new 
work’s values stems not because it is a substitute of the underlying 
work, but results in a new work of distinct value. While Campbell 
resolved the question of whether a commercial use could be fair, it 
has resulted in substantial confusion about what exactly is a 
transformative use.293 What must be transformed? Is the focus limited 
to the transformation of what was taken from the copyrighted work or 
should the new work be considered as a whole to determine whether a 
use is fair? As mentioned above, and will be elaborated on below, 
transformation is part of the continuum between a new work that is 
simply a facsimile of a copyrighted work through a derivative work 
and a work that merely uses the idea, functions, structures or 
																																								 																				
 292. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 293. Id. at 594 (“It was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the commercial 
nature of 2 Live Crew’s parody of “Oh, Pretty Woman” rendered it presumptively unfair. No 
such evidentiary presumption is available to address either the first factor, the character and 
purpose of the use, or the fourth, market harm, in determining whether a transformative use, 
such as parody, is a fair one.”). 
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processes of a work—“what is taught”—to a completely distinct 
work. 
This continuum is a process of transformation. Importantly, 
however, this transformation—which results in a use being fair—can 
occur even when precise expression has been copied. This type of 
analysis explains the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nintendo and 
allowed Google to persuade a jury to find it is otherwise infringing 
use of the JAVA SDK fair. Freeing the copyright protection of 
computer programs from its existing strained copyrightability analysis 
is not a panacea. Existing fair use jurisprudence, however, is 
confused. Overlaying the issues relevant to computer programs such 
as interoperability, the study of functionality, and ease of use, may 
well help inform this area of jurisprudence and result in a more 
consistent approach to when a use of another protected expression is 
fair because to enforce the copyright laws in a particular instance 
would not further the public good. To understand how 
fair/transformative use can apply to computer programs, it is helpful 
to review the development of the doctrine with works of aesthetics. 
3. The Fair Use Doctrine As Applied 
The fair use defense is a court-made limitation on exclusivity 
granted authors under copyright law. While recently some have 
attempted to conceptualize fair use as a First Amendment limitation 
on copyright protection, the better explanation is that courts have 
recognized that mechanical application of the general provisions of 
the Copyright Act can fail to further the constitutional purpose 
underlying the Act of promoting dissemination of ideas and 
learning.294 British common law recognized this tension even before 
Congress enacted its first copyright legislation. 
we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the 
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of 
the community, may not be deprived of their just merits and the reward of 
their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world not be deprived of 
																																								 																				
 294. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L SYMP. 43, 49 (1955). In 
discussing the origins of the court created fair use doctrine, Professor Cohen recognized that  
There is a strong social interest in enriching our culture and stimulating activities 
of a literary and artistic nature. The purpose of granting copyrights is, in the 
words of the Constitution, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 
To deny writers fair use of copyrighted materials would have exactly the 
opposite effect. So, the law has been that man may make use of the work of 
another “for the promotion of science, and the benefit of the public”  
Id. at 49 (quoting Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (N.P. 1802));  
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improvements, nor that the progress of the arts be retarded.295 
Courts in the United States began reading fair use limitations 
into Congress’s enactments as early as 1841.296 While few questioned 
the need for this court created exception, courts and commentators 
struggled to define a standard with relevant application beyond the 
unique facts of a case then before a court.297  
The problem stems from the variety of distinct uses for which 
the policy underlying the fair use exception is applicable, not 
including those outlined above for computer programs. These 
differing uses can be placed on a continuum from simply copying—
i.e. time shifting held permissible in Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios298—to uses wholly without reference to the underlying 
work—use of a few bars of a song in a play to add realism.299 
Unfortunately, the policy reasons for applying fair use do not fall 
neatly on the same continuum. Going across this spectrum, uses that 
present an audience more than simply a copy of the work seek fair use 
protection run the gambit from criticism and commentary on the work 
to new works whose reference to an underlying works serves 
purposes other than commenting on that work—Andy Warhol’s 
Campbell Soup silk screens—to instances where a new artist uses 
pieces of an underlying work the same way a painter uses the color 
blue without any interest, intent or purpose that the audience value the 
reference to the underlying work.  
																																								 																				
 295. Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, n. 140 (K.B. 1785); Mathews 
Coneyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (“Like rules are applicable to 
the so-called fair use which may be made of copyrighted material, based upon the principle that 
subsequent workers in the same field are not deprived of all use thereof, as, otherwise the 
progress of science and the useful arts would be unduly obstructed.”). Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1984) (“copyright is intended to 
increase and not impede the harvest of knowledge”). 
 296. See Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and its Legacy, 5 J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. 431 
(1998). 
 297. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984) 
(The doctrine of fair use has been called, with some justification, “‘the most troublesome in the 
whole law of copyright.’” quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); 
Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.Cas. 26, 59 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1869) (“What constitutes a fair and bona 
fide abridgment in the sense of the law is, or may be, under particular circumstances one of the 
most difficult questions which can bell arise for judicial consideration.”); Time Incorporated v. 
Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The doctrine is entirely 
equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition.”). 
 298. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 299. Shapiro, Berstein & Co., Inc. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 20 U.S.PQ. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 
1934). 
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Across this spectrum of use and referential use, well-reasoned 
opinions demonstrate why based on the unique facts of a case fair use 
was justified for a particular use while different facts involving the 
same degree of referential use did not justify the application of fair 
use.300  
																																								 																				
 300. Examples of differing results for similar uses as marked on the spectrum include: 
1. Copying of an entire work without alteration was held to be a fair use when 
for the non-commercial use of time shifting (Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)) but not permissible for sharing a copyrighted 
work with friends (A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (2001)); 
Failed to bring enough new to a painting of a photograph to be protectable as 
a derivative work. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange 698 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 
1983). Making the cartoon character Betty Boop into a three dimensional doll 
was infringing. Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 
1934). 
2. Sample used in rap song could be construed as a commentary on the 
underlying song itself and thus a parody entitling it to fair use protection. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. at 580. Newsworthy excerpts 
of book published in magazine without “commentary, research or criticism, 
in part because of the need for speed if [it] was to ‘make new’ was not a fair 
use.” Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 543. 
Use of an author’s unpublished letters in biography “to a large extent” made 
“the book worth reading” and was not a fair use. Salinger v. Random House, 
811 F.2d 90, 99 (9th Cir. 1987); compare Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 
F.2d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The biography’s use of Wright’s expressive 
works is modest and serves either to illustrate factual points or to establish 
Dr. Walker’s relationship with the author, not to ‘enliven’ her prose.”). 
3. Trivia game based on facts obtained from television show did not add 
sufficiently to the underlying, to be a fair use. Castle Rock Entertainment, 
Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Written guide to Beanie Babies held to be complementary entitled to fair use 
protection while the pictures of the toys themselves were not. Ty, Inc. v. 
Publications, Int’l Ltd, 292 F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 2002). An encyclopedia of 
Harry Potter based on the books about the character was not a fair use. 
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
4. Telling of the O.J. Simpson saga in a style that mimicked Dr. Seuss but not 
hold the style up to ridicule was not a parody and not a fair use. Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir 1996). Changing 
the lyrics of “When You Wish Upon a Star” to “I Need a Jew” in an episode 
of the television show Family Guy was a parody and entitled to fair use 
protection. Bourne v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 602 F.Supp.2d 499, 
511 (S.D. N. Y. 2009). Television series that brought to mind characters like 
superman and other superheroes not enough to be an infringement. Warner 
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Over time, courts have struggled to find a common thread 
linking the disparate instances where application of the fair use 
exception furthered the constitutional purpose of promoting public 
good from similar instances where the doctrine should have no 
application. Courts have (1) spoken of complementary verses 
superseding works,301 (2) limited the “privilege so that it shall not be 
exercised to an extent that the new work inflicts substantial injury to 
the property which is under the legal protection of copyright;”302 and 
(3) limited fair use to use of the ideas and not the expression of an 
underlying work.303 Decades before Congress endorsed the fair use 
defense, some scholars advocated for codification to bring order to 
this difficult judicial doctrine, while others cautioned: 
Making the doctrine statutory might clarify it, but at the risk of compelling 
unjust decisions in particular cases. The important thing is to reach a just 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
Bros. Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 
1983).  
5. The Second Circuit rejected a fair use defense finding that an artist’s 
sculpture developed from a photograph of puppies was not a commentary on 
the underlying photograph but referenced the underlying work as 
commentary on the commoditization of culture. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 
301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992). This same artist later created another work using a 
fashion photograph that was targeted to the fashion genre generally rather 
than as a parody of the specific photographed referenced that the same court 
found to be a fair use. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006). 
Well-Made Toy Mfg. v. Goffa Intern. Corp., 354 F.3d 112 (“Because the 
allegedly derivative work — the Huggable Lovable — sufficiently 
transformed the expression of the original work — the 20-inch Sweetie Mine 
— such that the two works ceased to be substantially similar, “the secondary 
work is not a derivative work and, for that matter, does not infringe the 
copyright of the original work,” (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143 n. 9)).  
 301. Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“Generalizing from this example in economic terminology that has been orthodox in fair-use 
case law, we may say that copying is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the sense that 
nails are complements to hammers) is fair use, but copying that is a substitute for the 
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes for pegs and screws) or derivative works 
from the copyrighted work . . . is not fair use.”); Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
245 F.Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (use of hand puppets on Captain Kangaroo if anything 
would promote sales of the hand puppets.  
 302. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.Cas. 26 (C.C. D Mass. 1869) (use of authors annotations to a 
new addition of a legal text in a subsequent edition of the same text was not a fair use). 
 303. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Then the 
question is whether the part so taken is “substantial,” and therefore not a “fair use” of the 
copyrighted work. . . . [T]here is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer 
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended.”) Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corporation, 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) [T]he defendants were entitled to use, not only all 
that had gone before, but even the plaintiffs’ contribution itself, if they drew from it only the 
more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its “expression.” We must therefore state in 
detail those similarities which seem to us to pass the limits of “fair use.” 
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result in the cases that do arise. Whether the doctrine is properly applied 
depends, as in many areas of the law, upon the wisdom and understanding 
of those on the bench. 304 
Congress finally codified the fair use limitation as part of the 
1976 Copyright Act.305 In recognizing this limitation on the rights 
granted authors, Congress stated that the enactment intended simply 
“to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, 
narrow, or enlarge it.”306 With its enactment Congress expected “court 
[to] continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication.” 
Congress’ enactment states several examples and four factors it 
gleaned from the case law. The four factors are: 
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is not for profit 
purposes;  
2. The nature of the copyrighted work; 
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work. 
 The Supreme Court in Campbell cautions that Congress 
articulated these factors and gave its examples to be “illustrative and 
not limiting” and to “provide only general guidance about the sorts of 
copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be 
fair uses.”307 The Campbell Court reiterated that “‘[t]he fair use 
doctrine thus “permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application 
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law was designed to foster.’”308  
Unfortunately, before Campbell, mechanical application of 
Section 107 limited fair use to referential works of criticism and 
commentary on the underlying work and other non-commercial 
convenient uses like time-shifting, ignoring completely referential 
uses as a tool for new creative works or for efficiency purposes 
																																								 																				
 304. Cohen, supra note 294, at 73.  
 305. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (“fair use remained 
exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act”). 
 306. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976). 
 307. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 308. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
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relevant to computer programming.309 Even after Campbell, courts 
routinely draw a line at parody, which necessarily comments on the 
underlying work, where a satire would not be a fair use because it 
lacks the referential comment.310 Some courts and commentators 
citing the Copyright Act purpose of fostering the dissemination of 
new ideas and learning, find this distinction to be arbitrary.311 Others, 
however, see significance in the criticism element of parody, which 
complements rather than substitutes for the underlying work, and 
satire, which is just a humorous substitute for the original.312 Many 
courts and commentators view the fair use doctrine as completely 
muddled.313 Others comment that the absolute nature of the defense—
free use if the defense prevails but all use enjoined if the defense 
fails—is the problem.314  
One thing, however, should be clear from the above discussion, 
it defies explication why this court-made doctrine in equity—a 
determination that the application of a law in a particular instance 
would not further the law’s purpose and therefore should not be 
																																								 																				
 309. Until the Supreme Court decided Campbell, lower courts, relying on prior Supreme 
Court decisions, consistently refused to consider any commercial use to be a fair use. Sony Corp 
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 484 U.S. at 451 (“every commercial use of 
copyrighted material is presumptively unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs 
to the owner of the copyright); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
at 562 (“The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is 
monetary gain, but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted 
material without paying the customary price.”). 
 310. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308 (requiring that new work be at least a parody of the 
underlying work “is a necessary rule as were it otherwise there would be no real limitation on 
the copier’s use of another’s copyrighted work”); Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, 109 
F.3d at 1401 (rejecting fair use defense because mimic of style did not hold style up to ridicule). 
 311. Kozinski & Newman, supra, note 246, at 516-18 (pointing out the arbitrariness the 
distinction between satire and parody); at least the Second Circuit claims to have abandoned this 
distinction in treatment between works of parody and works of satire. (Blanch v. Koons, 467 
F.3d 244, 255 (2nd Cir. 2006) (“We have applied Campbell in too many non-parody cases to 
require citation for the proposition that the broad principles of Campbell are not limited to cases 
involving parody.”)). 
 312. Ty, Inc. v. Publication Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002). In Ty, Judge 
Posner discussed the reason for distinguishing parody as follows: 
A parody, which is a form of criticism (good natured or otherwise), is not 
intended as a substitute for the work parodied. . . . A burlesque, however, is often 
just a humorous substitute for the original and so cuts into the demand for it . . . . 
Burlesques of that character, catering to the humor-loving segment of the 
original’s market, are not fair use. 
 313. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“the issue of fair 
use, which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright, and ought 
not to be resolved in cases where it may turn out to be moot”). 
 314. Kozinski, supra, note 246, at 521 (arguing against the availability of injunctive relief 
for derivative works). 
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applied in the instance—has become a factual question for an ill-
equipped jury to apply. 
2. Why Courts Developed the Fair Use Defense and the 
Supreme Court’s Return to the Basics 
Rather than fixating on Congress’s effort to capture the state of 
common law in 1976 and the problems with the mechanized test, it 
makes sense to consider again how the fair use doctrine developed, 
which may help clarify its application to computer programs 
independent of the four factor “test.” In Folsom v. Marsh,315 Justice 
Story confronted the use of more than 300 letters penned by George 
Washington taken from a twelve-volume collection of his writings 
and incorporated into a biography of the statesman entitled the Life 
and Writings of George Washington. Justice Story noted the creative 
step taken by the biography, “which [was] formed upon a plan 
different from that of [the collected works], and in which Washington 
is made mainly to tell the story of his own life, by inserting therein his 
letters and his messages, and other written documents, which such 
connecting lines in the narrative, as may illustrate and explain the 
times and circumstances and occasions of writing them.”316 Justice 
Story begins his opinion with the lament that “[t]his is one of those 
intricate and embarrassing questions, arising in the administration of 
civil justice, in which it is not, from the peculiar nature and character 
of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.”317 In 
considering whether the derivative use (incorporating the copyrighted 
letters into a biography) was justifiable, Justice Story noted that “the 
defendant has selected only such materials, as suited his own limited 
purpose as a biographer . . . and that he has produced an exceedingly 
valuable book.”318 Justice Story then noted the impact to the value of 
the underlying work. “If so much is taken, that the value of the 
original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are 
substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, in point 
of law to constitute a piracy pro tanto.”319 In finally concluding that 
defendants’ use was not justified, Justice Story stated “that the work 
of the defendants is mainly founded upon these letters, constituting 
more than one third of their work, and imparting to it its greatest, nay 
																																								 																				
 315. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (Mass. Cir. 1841). 
 316. Id. at 345. 
 317. Id. at 344. 
 318. Id. at 348. 
 319. Id. at 348. 
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its essential value. Without those letters, in its present form the work 
must fall to the ground.” Id. at 349.  
The Supreme Court in Campbell embraced Justice Story’s focus 
on the original creative expression brought by the second author to 
the derivate work, as subsequently illuminated by Judge Leval in a 
law review article ,320 by noting that the  
“central purpose [of the fair use investigation] is to see . . . whether the 
new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation . . . , 
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message; it 
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative. Although such transformative use is not necessary for a 
finding of fair use . . . the goal of copyright, to promote science and the 
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such 
works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing 
space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the 
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors like 
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.321 
Following Campbell’s broad language recognizing the 
importance of the transformative purpose made by the second author, 
courts and commentators cease upon this consideration in evaluating 
the fair use defense.322 While continuing to acknowledge the four 
factors in the Copyright Act, commentators have been emboldened to 
question whether these factors serve the purpose intended by the 
judicial created doctrine, and courts continue to expand the reach of 
																																								 																				
 320. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1112 (1990). 
Judge Leval’s article appears prompted in some part by his disagreement with Second Circuit’s 
analysis in Salinger v. Random, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) and New Era Publications Int’l v. 
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), which gave only limited consideration to the 
contribution of the second author, which both involved the use of the subjects unpublished 
letters by biographers without consent. Id. at 1112-1114. Reading the first of Congress’ fair use 
factors as direct to the second authors transformative purpose, Judge Leval concludes that “[t]he 
first fair use factor calls for a careful evaluation whether the particular quotation is of the 
transformative type that advances knowledge and the progress of the arts or whether it merely 
repackages, free riding on another’s creation.” Id. at 1116. 
 321. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citations and quotations omitted).  
 322. Prior to Campbell, courts routinely dispensed with fair used defenses by mechanically 
citing language from the Supreme Court’s prior fair use decision that “every commercial use of 
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that 
belongs to owner of the copyright.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (holding that consumers non-commercial time shifting of copyrighted 
material to be a fair use). Similarly, courts seemed predisposed against finding a fair use for new 
works of fiction or fantasy as opposed to factual or non-fiction works. Micro Star v. Formgen, 
Inc, 154 F.3d at 1113 (“The fair use defense will be much less likely to succeed when it is 
applied to fiction or fantasy creations, as opposed to factual works such as telephone listings.” 
(citing United Tel. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 855 F.2d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 1988); (Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 
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the fair use principles to situations where the second author has 
created something truly new.  
Unfortunately, courts and commentators following Campbell 
have struggled with how to reconcile the concepts of a derivative use, 
fair use, and transformative use—i.e. the point where although 
expression is taken it should be considered fair.323 As discussed 
above, all derivative works transform an underlying work to some 
extent. This does not mean, however, that all derivative works are 
transformative works within the meaning of Campbell. Nothing in 
Campbell can be read to narrow a copyright holder’s right to 
derivative works as provided in Section 106. Courts simply should 
not be uncomfortable considering the same evidence to determine 
whether a new work is a derivative and whether a work is sufficiently 
transformative to warrant a finding of fair use. On the other hand, a 
finding that a new work is a derivative work within the meaning of 
Section 106 is not required to conclude that the new work makes a 
transformative use of the underlying work within the meaning of 
Campbell. The new work can be a transformation of the idea 
underlying an expression, even if the expression is copied.  
It is also important to remember that the Campbell Court did not 
substitute its conclusion that a new work can be sufficiently 
transformative to be a fair use for the four court-created factors 
recognized by Congress in Section 107. New uses of copyrighted 
material can be fair even if the new works simply copies the 
underlying work—i.e. there is no transformation of expression 
sufficient to consider the work to be a derivative work. Recent cases 
involving the limited use of copyrighted materials as part of a news 
story,324 for purposes of facilitating searches on the internet,325 or in 
historical works of non-fiction326 can and should be considered fair 
																																								 																				
 323. See Reese, Transformative and Derivative Work Rights, 31 COLUM. J.L. 467 (2008) 
(“I conclude that appellate courts do not view fair us transformativeness as connected with any 
transformation involved in preparing a derivative work, and that in evaluating 
transformativeness the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any 
alteration the defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work.”).  
 324. Fitzgerald v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 491 F.Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(“News reporting is one of the categories of use expressly mentioned in the Copyright Act as 
particularly appropriate to the application of fair use doctrine.”).  
 325. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google has 
provided a significant benefit to the public. Weighing this significant transformative use against 
the unproven use of Google’s thumbnails for cell phone downloads, and considering the other 
fair use factors, all in light of the purpose of copyright, we conclude that Google’s use of Perfect 
10’s thumbnails is a fair use.”)  
 326. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The biography’s 
use of Wright’s expressive works is modest and serves either to illustrate factual points or to 
establish Dr. Walker’s relationship with the author, not to ‘enliven’ her prose.”). 
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uses irrespective of whether these uses can be considered 
transformative.  
This analysis should be equally applicable to computer programs 
to judge whether the expression taken is a fair use. One could argue 
that the reason for the strained focus on copyrightability found in 
many cases addressed to computer programs stems from the 
confusion around fair use. Although not a point expressed in any of 
those opinions, the analysis in Sega and the jury’s decision in Oracle 
indicates that fair use provides a firmer footing to evaluate the public 
good served by the application of copyright to a particular situation 
than copyrightability or the merger doctrine. 
What Campbell brought to fair use jurisprudence was the 
Court’s reaffirmation that consideration of the purpose and character 
of the new work’s use of the copyrighted material does not begin and 
end with whether the new use was commercial or not.327 The 
Campbell Court clarified that “[n]o ‘presumption’ or inference of 
market harm that might find support in Sony is applicable to a case 
involving something beyond mere duplication for commercial 
purpose.”328 Stated another way, does the commercial value of the 
new work created for a commercial purpose derive merely from what 
has been duplicated—resulting in a presumption of against fair use—
or is its commercial value derived primarily from what is new in the 
new work—a potentially transformative work where no presumption 
is appropriate?329  
Dispensing with a myopic focus on whether the new work was 
commercial or not, the Campbell Court freed fair use to reach new 
creative works that incorporate elements of existing works in new and 
different ways. In fact, the Campbell Court discussion of the fourth 
statutory fair use factor—the effect upon a potential market for value 
of the copyright work—narrowed “the only harm . . . that need 
																																								 																				
 327. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-84. The Campbell court, however, does draw a distinction 
between artistic works “The use . . . of a copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in 
parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry, than the 
sale of the parody for its own sake” Id. at 585. 
“The Court of Appeals . . . immediately cut short the enquiry into 2 Live Crew’s 
fair use claim by confining its treatment of the first factor essentially to one 
relevant fact, the commercial nature of the use. The court then inflated the 
significance of this fact by applying a presumption ostensibly culled from Sony 
that ‘every commercial use of copy-righted material is presumptively . . . unfair’ 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 451. In giving virtually dispositive weight to the commercial 
nature of the parody, the Court of Appeal erred.” Id. at 584. 
 328. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.  
 329. As will be discussed infra, recognizing transformative use as a consideration of the 
reason for the commercial value of the new work has allowed court to avoid the quagmire of 
what is and is not a commercial use when considered a right of publicity claim. 
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concern us . . . is the harm of market substitution.”330 Irrelevant is 
harm resulting from a derivative work “that adds something new, with 
a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning or message.”331 Seizing on this language, some 
argue post-Campbell that the complexities of using the language of 
transformation and substitution can be meliorated by utilizing tort 
lexicon of cognizable harm.332 Stated simply, in deciding whether a 
new use is fair, a court can consider whether the underlying copyright 
holder has suffered a copyright injury333 sufficiently definite to be 
compensable under ordinary tort law principles.334  
																																								 																				
 330. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593; see Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 
F.3d at 806. In Walking Mountain, the owner of Barbie sued a photographer who incorporated 
Barbie Dolls in his photographic works in less than a flattering manner, see e.g. Barbie in a 
blender. In affirming the grant of summary judgment for the artist based on a finding of fair use, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that the new “work could only reasonably substitute for a work in 
the market for adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie. We think it is safe to assume that 
Mattel would not enter such a market or license other to do so.” Walking Mountain Productions, 
353 F.3d at 806. The court continued, “the public benefit in allowing artistic creativity and 
social criticism to flourish is great. The fair use exception recognizes this important limitation 
on the rights of the owners of copyrights. No doubt, Mattel would be less likely to grant a 
license to an artist that intends to create art that criticizes and reflects negatively on Barbie’s 
image. It is not in the public interest to allow Mattel complete control over the kings of artistic 
works that use Barbie as a reference for criticism and comment.” Id. Curiously, the Walking 
Mountain Court does not discuss transformative use. Instead, the Court focused on parody even 
though its discussion of parody seems to reach beyond comment on Barbie to include social 
commentary as well. Id at 802. 
 331. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Simply editing out objectionable elements of a film to 
make a “clean” version available does not add something original as contemplated by a 
transformative use. Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1241 (“The 
transformative nature of the use of copyrighted material requires such a contribution of 
originality as may be of such public benefit as would serve the underlying purpose of providing 
copyright protection”). 
 332. Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12 VANDERBILT J. OF 
ENTM’T. & TECH. L. 701, 701 (Professor Cotter “argues that much of the current emphasis on 
transformative use is misguided and that court instead should focus the fair use inquiry on 
whether the defendant’s unauthorized use threatens cognizable harm to the copyright owner’s 
interest in exploiting her work.”) (emphasis in original). 
 333. Not all harm resulting from another use of a copyrighted material is an injury 
compensable under copyright law. For example while a well-publicized negative review of a 
book will likely have a greater economic impact on an author than the decision of a famous 
filmmaker to create a dramatic work from an obscure novel, only the latter gives right to an 
injury compensable under copyright law if the film is made without a license. See Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 591-92 (“a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the 
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”)  
 334. Looking at fair use in this context the battle lines in digital sampling become rather 
clear. The owner of the underlying copyright claims harm because the defendant could have 
obtained a license and the failure to obtain a license is a cognizable harm to the copyright 
holder. The creator of the new work might argue that the terms of any license are so 
economically prohibitive that the underlying copyright holder is actually blocking any 
substitutional work. As the Supreme Court noted in Campbell the underlying rights holder to 
Pretty Woman may not have been willing to license 2 Live Crew’s sample due to objections to 
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The Campbell Court’s active reconsideration of fair use and 
lower court’s continued struggle to grasp competing jurisprudence in 
this area reconfirms the difficult policy balance that must be struck in 
deciding whether a particular use should be protected as fair. Trial 
courts, whether intentionally or subconsciously, routinely treat the 
doctrine as equitable summarily deciding the issue while balancing 
facts, and reviewing courts continue to rebalance the facts de novo in 
their evaluation as to whether the policies underlying fair use when 
applied to the particular facts.335 While some argue that courts are 
improperly intruding on what should be a matter for the jury to 
decide, where, as here, courts themselves have a difficult time 
wrestling with this issue,336 it seems time that this duck is finally 
called a duck, and fair use be treated as the equitable defense that it 
is.337 The move towards this inevitability is indicated by one court’s 
conclusion that “every court to address the issue whether a 
defendant’s work qualifies as a parody”—the purpose and character 
																																								 																																							 																																							 									
the new song. Id. Courts have cited a rights holder’s likely unwillingness to license the new 
work as a reason to find a new transformative use fair. A distinction between a rights holder’s 
willingness to license the new use, however, seems like an arbitrary demarcation for 
determining whether a use is fair.  
 335. Harper & Row, Publishing, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. at 560 (“Where the 
district court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate 
court ‘need not remand for further fact finding . . . [but] may conclude as a matter of law that 
[the challenged use] do[es] not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work.’” (quoting Pacific 
& Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984))).  
 336. See Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenebaum, 672 F.Supp.2d 217 (D. Mass. 
2009). “Before addressing the merits of the fair use defense…[the Tenebaum Court] inquired 
whether fair use was historically an ‘equitable defense’ as a number of other courts have 
suggested. Since two leading copyright historians suggested that the equitable label may be a 
misnomer, and since neither party pressed the point, the Court will assume that fair use is a jury 
question, and leave the equitable origins of this defense for anther court to answer.” Id. at 223. 
 337. In one of the earliest articulations of the fair use defense, the court indicated that it 
would leave it for the jury to decide whether what was “‘taken used fairly.’” Cary v. Kearsley, 4 
Espinasse 168 (1802). See Bradshaw, Fair Dealing” as a Defense to Copyright Infringement in 
UK Law: A Historical Excursion from 1802 to the Clockwork Orange Case 1993, Irrespective 
of Lord Ellenborough’s willingness to let a jury decide whether what was taken by a subsequent 
author was fair, Congress in codifying fair use expressly recognized the defense’s equitable 
nature. The House Report expressly states 
“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over 
and over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since 
the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is 
possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own facts.” 
Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 448 n. 30 (1984) (quoting House Report). Since most agree 
that patent and copyright misuse are equitable defenses one wonders why the same reasoning 
does not extend to fair use. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 490-92 (1942), 
(recognizing patent misuse to be an equitable defense); Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970, 978 (1990) (recognizing copyright misuse as an equitable defense). 
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of use fair use factor—“has treated this question as one of law to be 
decided by the court.”338 
III.  CONCLUSION 
This article has covered a lot of ground and many of its 
conclusions are likely far from uncontroversial. I suggest that a 
computer program can be protected under the Copyright Act in more 
than one way. It can be protected in the manner that users interact 
with it most often—as an audiovisual work. It can be separately 
protected as a literary work, the manner in which Congress has 
expressly identified under the Copyright Act. These two forms of 
protection should be seen as distinct, in the same way we distinguish 
between the protection of a sound recording and its written 
composition. The meaning of “function” for our use of a computer 
program as an audiovisual work differs from the meaning of 
“function” as it relates to the protection of the computer program as 
text. This is the distinction between Lotus and Oracle discussed 
above. Additionally, it raises the importance of access to a computer 
program as text, which is occulted when source code must be 
compiled to run on a computer. 
The Copyright Act’s treatment of programming as literary is 
consistent with the actual practice of programming. While many have 
questioned the wisdom of this choice, suggesting that programming is 
more akin to industrial design, the practice of programming simply 
does not lend itself to the objective standards common to other 
mechanized functions, processes or structures. The act of 
programming is much more like that of writing literature, and it is 
appropriate to recognize the creativity expressed in the architecture 
and design documents that instruct the code ultimately written—as we 
do with the structure of a novel or film—and not to elevate the source 
code itself, which would be inconsistent with what programmer see as 
the value of what they do. Similarly, viewing programming as 
literature easily distinguish the craft from the implementation of ideas 
functions or process that are protected by patent law. 
Efforts to limit copyright protection of a program’s expression to 
allow for interoperability and to ease use—relying on the “merger 
doctrine” and expanded notions of functionality—seem tortured. The 
Federal Circuit in Oracle correctly recognized that what is protectable 
about a computer program must be decided from the perspective of 
																																								 																				
 338. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d at 801 (citing Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 582-83; Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir. 
1998); Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400-01). 
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the author at the time of creation. Nothing supports that a copyrighted 
work loses some of its protections as the work becomes more popular. 
Instead, the rights of others to use protected expression should be 
decided based on the doctrine of fair use. 
The article suggests that the abstraction/filtration test currently 
employed to dissect protected expression from unprotected ideas, 
structures function or process is impossible. Asking court to start with 
a program’s source code and work back to differentiate “what is 
taught” from “how it is taught” is asking too much from judges not 
steeped in programming. Rather than first separating “what is taught” 
from “how it is taught” so that the jury only focuses on the expressive 
teaching, it seems to make much more sense to first identify 
similarities in what is taught and then see if the copyright holder can 
prove that what is shared extends to reach the manner of teaching. If 
the copyright holder succeeds in proving that more was taken than 
“what was taught,” the defendant is then free to demonstrate that the 
new work is transformative of what was taken, such that the policies 
underlying the Copyright Act are not further by its application to the 
unique case. Whether the purpose of a law is further by its application 
to a particular case, however, has never a question for a jury—
unfamiliar with the underlying purpose of any law—to decide. So it 
makes no sense for jury to be asked to decide whether an infringing 
use of a protected work should be excused in order to further the 
underlying purposes of the Copyright Act, especially when that is at 
issue is a computer program. 
While some argue that copyright hinders rather than furthers the 
public good with respect to computer programs, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the ambiguity of the Act’s application to computer 
programs rather than the Act itself is what stifles innovation. Giving 
an author the ability to protect their creative expression does not mean 
they must use the tool. Similarly, as is the case with FOSS’s co-opted 
copyleft platform, the availability of copyright protection can be used 
not only for monetary ends, but to support a political agenda. It is the 
lack of comfort that copyright will protect an author’s source code 
that likely causes authors to hide their code from the public. If 
enforcement was clear and readily available, source code could be 
more widely disseminated because authors could be confident that the 
taking of their expression in a manner inconsistent with terms of 
use—whether those terms or monetary or otherwise—could be 
stopped. 
Obviously, our copyright laws are not objectively correct or 
objectively economically optimized, nor could they ever be. 
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Intellectual property laws like all laws are simply rules groups of 
people agree to either voluntarily or coercively. Rather than right or 
wrong, they are simply political. Their accuracy should be compared 
with the rules governing sports or games rather than statistics. We 
chose to live by rules not for their correctness, but because we do not 
trust our neighbor to honor the general principles of liberty; we each 
have the freedom to act to the extent our actions do not interfere with 
the rights of others in a manner that they would not consent to as 
reasonable. This is not to say that laws, and in particular, intellectual 
property laws, do not have social and economic ramification. Laws 
and the absence of laws, however, both have ramifications. Any law 
will have winners and losers, just as the absence of laws will have the 
same, but line drawing is simply political. 
Many speak about abolishing intellectual property laws because 
they advantage some over others and they can be said to have both 
beneficial and deleterious effects on the “common good.” The 
Founding Fathers faced this issue—what to do with ownership of 
property and in particular what to do with ownership of intellectual 
property. The Founding Fathers, while vaguely, rightly or wrongly 
concluded that the federal government may regulate in this area in 
order to promote science and the useful arts. The Founding Fathers 
concluded the public good is furthered by promoting the development 
of science and the useful arts within the country.  
It is true that the owners of these rights granted by Congress can 
use them to extract economic benefit—a motivation for many. More 
recently, however, those who could benefit from such rights have 
pursued such rights because they grant benefits that are non-economic 
as well. The possessor of such rights can influence how their rights 
are used by others even if the benefit they seek is not money. They 
extract other concessions in exchange for use—such as requiring open 
and public dissemination of any use (e.g., requiring open source of 
any software code).  
For those who see intellectual property law as retarding rather 
than furthering the public good, their view may be too narrow. Just as 
changes to any intellectual property law changes the balance of 
winners and losers, nothing supports that the abolition of intellectual 
property laws would result in an egalitarian utopia. And this is not 
simply saying that content creators deserve compensation for their 
creations.  
This is especially true today with technology. If we abolished all 
copyright protection on music and allowed endless versions of 
Napster to exist, technology today tells us that this does not mean we 
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will all have free access to all of the music that we want. Streaming 
now means that access does not require transfer of a file. Just think of 
the current trend of exclusive music releases. Technology itself 
imposes the barriers to access. 
This brings us to software. The absolutism of many with respect 
to how software should be treated under the law misses the nuances. 
The correct legal regime under which software can or should be 
regulated or whether it should be regulated at all is a political 
decision—there is no economically or socially correct answer. 
Whatever Congress decides to do with respect to its authority in this 
area will have winners and losers.  
Similarly, many who write and think in the area of software and 
law incorrectly take a rather myopic view of all of the various 
manifestations that fall within the term software. In this regard, 
software is something like painting. Painting includes the utilitarian 
act of painting the wall of a house, to the painting of a sign, to a work 
of fine art. Are the all the same? Software is like architecture. No one 
would say that architecture is simply a completed structure, but 
includes sketches drawing, blueprints, models, construction, utility 
and creativity. We all recognize that all software must be written and 
for this reason falls under the rubric of literature in the Copyright Act. 
But writing is not myopic. Writing includes news copy, a phone book, 
or a great novel. We do not treat all writings the same nor should we 
treat all software or all aspects of software the same way.  
The law has looked at software as utilitarian. Historically, 
software and hardware entered commerce together with specifically 
designed machines having specifically designed instructions for their 
function. Software, however, is now divorced from hardware; today, 
the two are independent. Moreover, hardware has ceded more and 
more ground to software. Today we have an ever more generic piece 
of hardware capable of ever more unique and difference activities 
because of the differing instructions it is now capable of following. 
Moreover, those involved in coding view code today as much more 
than simply function. Today in the art world, code is simple a tool of 
expression no different than paint and a paintbrush or an electric 
guitar. This brings us back to Autechre. Autechre does not simply 
playing virtual instruments on a laptop computer, but instead create 
code that generates music on its own or in collaboration with other 
code or a person. Code in this instance is no more a functional utility 
than a guitar solo by Jimi Hendrix is a functional utility because all he 
was doing is manipulating a guitar. Many will argue that what 
Hendrix was doing was purely aesthetic, had no utility, and therefore 
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properly falls within the realm of copyright. Anyone who suggests 
that should listen to a song by Autechre.  
